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Abstract
Differential privacy has become a widely accepted notion of privacy, leading to the intro-
duction and deployment of numerous privatization mechanisms. However, ensuring the privacy
guarantee is an error-prone process, both in designing mechanisms and in implementing those
mechanisms. Both types of errors will be greatly reduced, if we have a data-driven approach to
verify privacy guarantees, from a black-box access to a mechanism. We pose it as a property
estimation problem, and study the fundamental trade-offs involved in the accuracy in estimated
privacy guarantees and the number of samples required. We introduce a novel estimator that
uses polynomial approximation of a carefully chosen degree to optimally trade-off bias and vari-
ance. With n samples, we show that this estimator achieves performance of a straightforward
plug-in estimator with n lnn samples, a phenomenon referred to as effective sample size am-
plification. The minimax optimality of the proposed estimator is proved by comparing it to a
matching fundamental lower bound.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy is gaining popularity as an agreed upon measure of privacy leakage, widely
used by the government to publish Census statistics [Abo18], Google to aggregate user’s choices
in web-browser features [EPK14, FPE16], Apple to aggregate mobile user data [Tea17], and smart
meters in telemetry [DKY17]. As increasing number of privatization mechanisms are introduced and
deployed in the wild, it is critical to have countermeasures to check the fidelity of those mechanisms.
Such techniques will allow us to hold accountable the deployment of privatization mechanisms if
the claimed privacy guarantees are not met, and find and fix bugs in implementations of those
mechanisms.
A user-friendly tool for checking privacy guarantees is necessary for several reasons. Writing a
program for a privatization mechanism is error-prone, as it involves complex probabilistic compu-
tations. Even with customized languages for differential privacy, checking the end-to-end privacy
guarantee of an implementation remains challenging [BKOZB12, WDW+19]. Furthermore, even
when the implementation is error-free, there have been several cases where the mechanism designers
have made errors in calculating the privacy guarantees, and falsely reported higher level of privacy
[LSL17, CM15]. This is evidence of an alarming issue that analytically checking the proof of a
privacy guarantee is a challenging process even for an expert. An automated and data-driven al-
gorithm for checking privacy guarantees will significantly reduce such errors in the implementation
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and the design. On other cases, we are given very limited information about how the mechanism
works, like Apple’s white paper [Tea17]. The users are left to trust the claimed privacy guarantees.
To address these issues, we propose a data-driven approach to estimate how much privacy is
guaranteed, from a black-box access to a purportedly private mechanism. Our approach is based
on an optimal polynomial approximation that gracefully trades off bias and variance. We study
the fundamental limit of how many samples are necessary to achieve a desired level of accuracy in
the estimation, and show that the proposed approach achieves this fundamental bound.
Problem formulation. Differential privacy (DP) introduced in [Dwo11] is a formal mathemat-
ical notion of privacy that is widespread, due to several key advantages. It gives one of the
strongest guarantees, allows for precise mathematical analyses, and is intuitive to explain even
to non-technical end-users. When accessing a database through a query, we say the query output
is private if the output did not reveal whether a particular person’s entry is in the database or
not. Formally, we say two databases are neighboring if they only differ in one entry (one row in a
table, for example). Let PQ,D denote the distribution of the randomized output to a query Q on
a database D. We consider discrete valued mechanisms taking one of S values, i.e. the response
to a query is in [S] = {1, . . . , S} for some integer S. We say a mechanism guarantees (ε, δ)-DP,
[Dwo11], if the following holds
PQ,D(E) ≤ eεPQ,D′(E) + δ , (1)
for some ε ≥ 0, δ ∈ [0, 1], and all subset E ⊆ [S] and for all neighboring databases D and D′. When
δ = 0, (ε, 0)-DP is referred to as (pure) differential privacy, and the general case of δ ≥ 0 is referred
to as approximate differential privacy. For pure DP, the above condition can be relaxed as
PQ,D(x) ≤ eεPQ,D′(x) , (2)
for all output symbol x ∈ [S], and for all neighboring databases D and D′. This condition can now
be checked, one symbol x at a time from [S], without having to enumerate all subsets E ⊆ [S].
This naturally leads to the following algorithm.
For a query Q and two neighboring databases D and D′ of interest, we need to verify the
condition in Eq. (2). As we only have a black-box access to the mechanism, we collect n responses
from the mechanism on the two databases. We check the condition on the empirical distribution
of those collected samples, for each x ∈ [S]. If it is violated for any x, we assert the mechanism to
be not (ε, 0)-DP and present x as an evidence. Focusing only on pure DP, [DWW+18] proposed
an approach similar to this, where they also give guidelines for choosing the databases D and D′
to test. However, their approach is only evaluated empirically, no statistical analysis is provided,
and a more general case of approximate DP is left as an open question, as the condition in Eq. (1)
cannot be decoupled like Eq. (2) when δ > 0.
We propose an alternative approach from first principles to check the general approximate DP
guarantees, and prove its minimax optimality. Given two probability measures P = [p1, . . . , pS ]
and Q = [q1, . . . , qS ] over [S] = {1, . . . , S}, we define the following approximate DP divergence with
respect to ε as
dε(P‖Q) ,
S∑
i=1
[pi − eεqi]+ = Ex∼P
[ [
1− eε qx
px
]+ ]
. (3)
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where [x]+ = max{x, 0}. The last representation indicates that this metric falls under a broader
class of metrics known as f -divergences, with a special choice of f(x) = [1 − eεx]+. From the
definition of DP, it follows that a mechanism is (ε, δ)-DP if and only if dε(PQ,D‖PQ,D′) ≤ δ for
all neighboring databases D and D′. We propose estimating this divergence dε(PQ,D‖PQ,D′) from
samples, and comparing it to the target δ. This only requires number of operations scaling as S lnn
where n is the sample size.
In this paper, we suppose there is a specific query Q of interest, and two neighboring databases
D and D′ have been already selected either by a statistician who has some side information on
the structure of the mechanism or by some algorithm, such as those from [DWW+18]. Without
exploiting the structure (such as symmetry, exchangeability, or invariance to the entries of the
database conditioned on the true output of the query), one cannot avoid having to check all possible
combinations of neighboring databases. As a remedy, [GM18] proposes checking randomly selected
databases. This in turn ensures a relaxed notion of privacy known as random differential privacy.
Similarly, [DJRT13] proposed checking the typical databases, assuming there we have access to a
prior distribution over the databases. Our framework can be seamlessly incorporated with such
higher-level routines to select databases.
Contributions. We study the problem of estimating the approximate differential privacy guaran-
teed by a mechanism, from a black-box access where we can sample from the mechanism output
given a query Q, a database D, and a target (ε, δ). We first show that a straightforward plug-in
estimator of dε(P‖Q) achieves mean squared error scaling as (eεS)/n, where S is the size of the
alphabet and n is the number of samples used (Section 2.1.1).
In the regime where we fix S and increase the sample size, this achieves the parametric rate
of 1/n, and cannot be improved upon. However, in many cases of practical interest where S is
comparable to n, we show that this can be improve upon with a more sophisticated estimator.
To this end, we introduce a novel estimator of dε(P‖Q). The main idea is to identify the regimes
of non-smoothness in [pi − eεqi]+ where the plug-in estimator has a large bias. We replace it
by the uniformly best polynomial approximation of the non-smooth regime of the function, and
estimate those polynomial from samples. By selecting appropriate degree of the polynomial, we
can optimally trade off the bias and variance. We provide an upper bound on the error scaling as
(eεS)/(n lnn), when S and n are comparable. We prove that this is the best one can hope for, by
providing a minimax lower bound that matches.
We first show this for the case when we know P and sample from Q in Section 2.1, to lay out
the main technical insights while maintaining simple exposition. Then, we consider the practical
scenario where both P and Q are accessed via samples, and provide an minimax optimal estimator
in Section 2.2. This phenomenon is referred to as effective sample size amplification; one can achieve
with n samples a desired error rate, that would require n lnn samples for a plug-in estimator. We
present numerical experiments supporting our theoretical predictions in Section 3, and use our
estimator to identify those real-world and artificial mechanisms that have incorrectly reported the
privacy guarantees.
Related work. Formally guaranteeing differential privacy is a challenging and error-prone task.
Principled approaches have been introduced to derive the end-to-end privacy loss of a software
program that uses multiple differentially private accesses to the data, including SQL-based lan-
guages [McS09], higher-order functional languages [RP10], and imperative languages [CGLN11]. A
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unifying recipe of these approaches is to combine standard mechanisms like Laplacian, exponential,
and Gaussian mechanisms [Dwo11, MT07, GKOV15], and calculate the end-to-end privacy loss
using the composition theorem [KOV17]. To extend these approaches to a more general notion of
approximate differential privacy and allow non-standard components, principled approaches have
been proposed in [BKOZB12, WDW+19]. The main idea is to perform fine-grained reasoning about
the complex probabilistic computations involved. These existing approaches have been preemptive
measures aimed at automated verification of privacy of the source code. Instead, we seek a post-hoc
measure of estimating the privacy guarantee, given a black-box access to a privatization mechanism
and not the source code.
Several published mechanisms have mistakes in the privacy guarantees. These are variations of
a popular mechanism known as Sparse Vector Technique (SVT). The original SVT first generates a
random threshold. To answer a sequence of queries, it adds a random noise to each query output,
and respond whether this is higher than the threshold (true) or not (false). This process continues
until either all queries are answered, each with a privatized Boolean response or if the number
of trues meets a pre-defined bound. Several variations violate claimed DP guarantees. [SCM14]
proposes variant of SVT with no noise adding and no bound on the number of trues, which does
not satisfy DP for any values of ε. [CXZX15] makes a similar false claim, proposing a version of
SVT with no bound on the number of trues. [LC14] adds a smaller noise independent of the bound
on the trues. [Rot11] outputs the actual noisy vector instead of the Boolean vector.
A formal investigation into verifying DP guarantees of a given mechanism was addressed in
[DJRT13]. DP condition is translated into a certain Lipschitz condition on PQ,D over the databases
D, and a Lipschitz tester is proposed to check the conditions. However, this approach is not data
driven, as it requires the knowledge of the distribution PQ,D and no sampling of the mechanism
outputs is involved. [GM18] analyzes tradeoffs involved in testing DP guarantees. It is shown that
one cannot get accurate testing without sacrificing the privacy of the databases used in the testing.
Hence, when testing DP guarantees, one should not use databases that contain sensitive data. We
compare some of the techniques involved in Section 2.1.1.
Our techniques are inspired by a long line of research in property estimation of a distribution
from samples. In particular, there has been significant recent advances for high-dimensional estima-
tion problems, starting from entropy estimation for discrete random variables in [VV13, JVHW15,
WY16]. The general recipe is to identify the regime where the property to be estimated is not
smooth, and use functional approximation to estimate a smoothed version of the property. This
has been widely successful in support recovery [WY19], density estimation with `1 loss [HJW15],
and estimating Renyi entropy [AOST17]. more recently, this technique has been applied to estimate
certain divergences between two unknown distributions, for Kullback-Leibler divergence [HJW16],
total variation distance [JHW18], and identity testing [DKW18]. With carefully designed estima-
tors, these approximation-based approaches can achieve improvement over typical parametric rate
of 1/n error rate, sometimes referred to as effective sample size amplification.
Notations. We let the alphabet of a discrete distribution be [S] = {1, . . . , S} for some positive
integer S denoting the size of the alphabet. We let MS denote the set of probability distributions
over [S]. We use f(n) & g(n) to denote that supn f(n)/g(n) ≥ C for some constant C, and
f(n) . g(n) is analogously defined. f(n)  g(n) denotes that f(n) & g(n) and f(n) . g(n).
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2 Estimating differential privacy guarantees from samples
We want to estimate dε(P‖Q) from a blackbox access to the mechanism outputs accessing two
databases, i.e. P = PQ,D and Q = PQ,D′ . We first consider a simpler case, where P = [p1, . . . , pS ] is
known and we observe samples from an unknown distribution Q = [q1, . . . , qS ] in Section 2.1. We
cover this simpler case first to demonstrate the main ideas on the algorithm design and analysis
technique while maintaining the exposition simple. This paves the way for our main algorithmic
and theoretical results in Section 2.2, where we only have access to samples from both P and Q.
2.1 Estimating dε(P‖Q) with known P
For a given budget n, representing an upper bound on the expected number of samples we can
collect, we propose sampling a random number N of samples from Poisson distribution with mean
n, i.e. N ∼ Poi (n). Then, each sample Xj ∈ [S] is drawn from Q for j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and we let
Qn = [qˆ1, . . . , qˆS ] denote the resulting histogram divided by n, such that qˆi , |{j ∈ [N ] : Xi = j}|/n.
Note that Qn is not the standard empirical distribution, as
∑
i qˆi 6= 1 with high probability.
However, in this paper we refer to Qn as empirical distribution of the samples. The empirical
distribution would have been divided by N instead of n. Instead, Qn is the maximum likelihood
estimate of the true distribution Q. This Poisson sampling, together with the MLE construction of
Qn, ensures independence among {qˆi}Si=1, making the analysis simpler. We first analyze the sample
complexity of a simple plug-in estimator dε(P‖Qn) in Section 2.1.1. This is well-defined regardless
of whether Qn sums to one or not. We next show that we can significantly improve the sample
complexity by using a novel estimator, Algorithm 1, in Section 2.1.2. We show minimax optimality
of the proposed estimator by proving a matching lower bound in Section 2.1.3.
2.1.1 Performance of the plug-in estimator
The following result shows that it is necessary and sufficient to have n ≈ eε S samples to achieve an
arbitrary desired error rate, if we use this plug-in estimator dε(P‖Qn), under the worst-case P and
Q. Some assumption on (P,Q) is inevitable as it is trivial to achieve zero error for any sample size,
for example if P and Q have disjoint supports. Both dε(P‖Q) and dε(P‖Qn) are 1 with probability
one. We provide a proof in Section 4.2. The bound in Eq. (6) also holds for dε(Pn‖Q). The proof
technique is analogous, and we omit the proof here.
Theorem 1. For any ε ≥ 0, support size S ∈ Z+, and distribution P ∈MS, the plug-in estimator
satisfies
sup
Q∈MS
EQ
[ |dε(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)|2 ] . ( S∑
i=1
pi ∧
√
eεpi
n
)2
+
eε
n
, (4)
with expected number of samples n. If S ≥ 2, we can also lower bound the worst case mean squared
error as
sup
Q∈MS
EQ
[ |dε(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)|2 ] & ( S∑
i=1
pi ∧
√
eεpi
n
)2
. (5)
When n ≥ eεS, it follows that right-hand side of the lower bound is at least eεS/n, and the
matching upper and lower bounds can be simplified as follows, for the worst case P and Q.
5
Corollary 2. If n ≥ eεS and S ≥ 2, we have
sup
P,Q∈MS
EQ
[ |dε(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)|2 ]  eεS
n
. (6)
A similar analysis was done in [GM18], which gives an upper bound scaling as e2εS/n. We
tighten the analysis by a factor of eε, and provide a matching lower bound.
2.1.2 Achieving optimal sample complexity with a polynomial approximation
We construct a minimax optimal estimator using techniques first introduced in [WY16, JVHW15]
and adopted in several property estimation problems including [HJW15, HJW16, AOST17, JHW18,
DKW18, WY19].
Algorithm 1 Differential Privacy (DP) estimator with known P
Input: target privacy ε ∈ R+, query Q, neighboring databases (D,D′), pmf of PQ,D
samples from PQ,D′ , degree K ∈ Z+, constants c1, c2 ∈ R+, expected sample size 2n
Output: estimate d̂ε,K,c1,c2(P‖Qn) of dε(PQ,D‖PQ,D′)
P ← PQ,D
Draw two independent sample sizes: N1 ← Poi (n) and N2 ← Poi (n)
Sample from PQ,D′ : {Xi,1}N1i=1 ∈ [S]N1 and {Xi,2}N2i=1 ∈ [S]N2
qˆi,j ← |{`∈[Nj ]:X`,j=i}|n for all i ∈ [S] and j ∈ {1, 2}
Qn,1 ← [qˆ1,1, . . . , qˆS,1] and Qn,2 ← [qˆ1,2, . . . , qˆS,2]
for i = 1 to S do
δi ←

0 , if qˆi,1 > U(pi; c1, c2)
D˜K(qˆi,2; pi) , if qˆi,1 ∈ U(pi; c1, c2)
[pi − eεqˆi,2]+ , if qˆi,1 < U(pi; c1, c2)
end for
d̂ε,K,c1,c2(P‖Qn)← 0 ∨ (1 ∧
∑S
i=1 δi)
To simplify the analysis, we split the samples randomly into two partitions, each having an
independent and identical distribution of Poi (n) samples from the multinomial distribution Q. We
let Qn,1 = [qˆ1,1, . . . , qˆS,1] denote the count of the first set of N1 ∼ Poi (n) samples (normalized
by n), and Qn,2 = [qˆ1,1, . . . , qˆS,1] the second set of N2 ∼ Poi (n) samples. See Algorithm 1 for a
formal definition. Note that for the analysis we are collecting 2n samples in total on average. In
all the experiments, however, we apply our estimator without partitioning the samples. A major
challenge in achieving the minimax optimality is in handling the non-smoothness of the function
f(qˆi; pi) , [pi − eεqˆi]+ at pi ' eεqˆi. We use one set of samples to identify whether an outcome
i ∈ [S] is in the smooth regime (qˆi,1 /∈ U(p; c1, c2)) or not (qˆi,1 ∈ U(p; c1, c2)), with an appropriately
defined set function:
U(p; c1, c2) ,
 [0,
(c1+c2) lnn
n ] , if p ≤ c1e
ε lnn
n ,[
e−εp−
√
c2e−εp lnn
n , e
−εp+
√
c2e−εp lnn
n
]
, otherwise,
(7)
for c1 ≥ c2 > 0 and p ∈ [0, 1]. The scaling of the interval is chosen carefully such that (a) it is large
enough for the probability of making a mistake on the which regime (pi, qi) falls into to vanishes
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(Lemma 14); and (b) it is small enough for the variance of the polynomial approximation in the
non-smooth regime to match that of the other regimes (Lemma 15). In the smooth regime, we use
the plug-in estimator. In the non-smooth regime, we can improve the estimation error by using the
best polynomial approximation of f(x; pi) = [pi − eε x]+, which has a smaller bias:
DK(x; p) , arg min
P∈polyK
max
x˜∈U(p;c1,c1)
∣∣ [p− eεx˜]+ − P (x˜) ∣∣ , (8)
where polyK is the set of polynomial functions of degree at most K, and we approximate f(x; p)
in an interval U(p; c1, c1) ⊃ U(p; c1, c2) for any c1 > c2. Having this slack of c1 > c2 in the
approximation allows us to guarantee the approximation quality, even if the actual qi is not exactly
in the non-smooth regime U(p; c1, c2). Once we have the polynomial approximation, we estimate
this polynomial function DK(qi; pi) from samples, using the uniformly minimum variance unbiased
estimator (MVUE).
There are several advantages that makes this two-step process attractive. As we use an unbiased
estimate of the polynomial, the bias is exactly the polynomial approximation error of DK(x; pi),
which scales as (1/K)
√
(pi lnn)/n. Larger degree K reduces the approximation error, and larger n
reduces the support of the domain we apply the approximation to in U(p; c1, c1) (Lemma 15). The
variance is due to the sample estimation of the polynomial DK(x; pi), which scales as (B
Kpi lnn)/n
for some universal constant B (Lemma 15). Larger degree K increases the variance. We prescribe
choosing K = c3 lnn for appropriate constant c3 to optimize the bias-variance tradeoff in Algo-
rithm 1. The resulting two-step polynomial estimator, has two characterizations, depending on
where pi is. Let ∆ = (c1 lnn)/n.
Case 1: pi ≤ eε∆ and qˆi ∈ U(pi; c1, c1) = [0, 2∆]. We consider the function g(y) = [pi−eε2∆y]+ by
substituting 2∆y = x into f(pi, x) = [pi− eεx]+. Let HK(y) be the best polynomial approximation
of g(y) ∈ C[0, 1] with order K, i.e. HK(y) = arg minP∈polyK maxy′∈[0,1]
∣∣ g(y′)− P (y′) ∣∣ and denote
it as HK(y) =
∑K
j=0 ajy
j . Then DK(x; pi) = HK(x/(2∆)) =
∑K
j=0 aj(2∆)
−jxj . Once we have the
polynomial approximation, we estimate with the uniformly minimum variance unbiased estimator
(MVUE) to estimate DK(qˆi; pi).
D˜K(qˆi; pi) =
K∑
j=0
aj(2∆)
−j
j−1∏
k=0
(qˆi − k
n
) . (9)
Computing the aj ’s can be challenging, and we discuss this for the general case when P is not
known in Section 2.2.
Case 2: pi > e
ε∆ and qˆi ∈ [e−εpi −
√
e−εpi∆, e−εpi +
√
e−εpi∆]. In this regime, the best
polynomial approximation DK(x; pi) of [pi − eεx]+ is given by
DK(x; pi) =
eε
2
K∑
j=0
rj
(√
e−εpi∆
)−j+1
(x− e−εpi)j + pi − e
εx
2
,
where rj ’s are defined from the best polynomial approximation RK(y) of g(y) = |y| on [−1, 1]
with order K: RK(y) =
∑K
j=0 rjy
j . The unique uniformly minimum variance unbiased estimator
(MVUE) for (qi − pi)j is
gj,pi(qˆi) ,
j∑
k=0
(
j
k
)
(−pi)j−k
k−1∏
h=0
(
qˆi − h
n
)
,
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shown in Lemma 12. Hence,
D˜K(x; pi) =
eε
2
( K∑
j=0
rj
(√
e−εpi∆
)−j+1
gj,e−εpi(qˆi) + g1,e−εpi(qˆi)
)
.
The coefficients rj ’s only depend on K and can be pre-computed and stored in a table.
Choosing an appropriate K scaling as lnn, we can prove an upper bound on the error scaling
as 1/(n lnn). This proves that the proposed estimator achieves the minimax optimal performance.
Theorem 3. For any P , suppose c lnS ≤ lnn ≤ C ln(e−ε∑Si=1√eεpi ∧ pi√n lnn) for some con-
stants c and C, then there exist constants c1, c2 and c3 that only depends on c, C and ε such
that
sup
Q∈MS
EQ
[ ∣∣ d̂ε,K,c1,c2(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q) ∣∣2 ] . ( S∑
i=1
pi ∧
√
eεpi
n lnn
)2
, (10)
for K = c3 lnn and where d̂ε,K,c1,c2 is defined in Algorithm 1.
We provide a proof in Section 4.3, and a matching lower bound in Theorem 5. A simplified
upper bound follows from Jensen’s inequality.
Corollary 4. For worst case P and Q, if lnn ≤ C ′(lnS−ε) for some C ′, then there exist constants
c1, c2 and c3, such that for K = c3 lnn,
sup
P,Q∈MS
EQ
[ ∣∣ d̂ε,K,c1,c2(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q) ∣∣2 ] . eεSn lnn . (11)
Note that the plug-in estimator in Corollary 2 achieves the parametric rate of 1/n. In the
low-dimensional regime, where we fix S and grow n, this cannot be improved upon. To go beyond
the parametric rate, we need to consider a high-dimensional regime, where S grows with n. Hence,
a condition similar to lnn ≤ C ′ lnS is necessary, although it might be possible to further relax it.
2.1.3 Matching minimax lower bound
In the high-dimensional regime, where S grows with n sufficiently fast, we can get a tighter lower
bound then Theorem 1, that matches the upper bound in Theorem 3. Again, supremum over Q
is necessary as there exists (P,Q) where it is trivial to achieve zero error, for any sample size (see
Section 2.1.1 for an example). For any given P we provide a minimax lower bound in the following.
Theorem 5. Suppose S ≥ 2 and there exists a constant C > 0 such that lnn ≥ C lnS. Then for
any P , there exists a constant C ′ that only depends on C such that if
∑S
j=1 pj ∧
√
eεpj/(n lnn) ≥
C ′
(√
(eε lnn)/n+ (eε
√
S lnn)/n
)
, then
inf
d̂ε(P‖Qn)
sup
Q∈MS
EQ
[ ∣∣ d̂ε(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q) ∣∣2 ] & ( S∑
i=1
pi ∧
√
eεpi
n lnn
)2
, (12)
where the infimum is taken over all possible estimator.
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A proof is provided in Section 4.4. When lnn ≤ C lnS and n ≥ c(eεS)/lnS, the condition∑S
j=1 pj ∧
√
eεpj/(n lnn) ≥ C ′
(√
(eε lnn)/n+ (eε
√
S lnn)/n
)
is satisfied for uniform distribution
P , and we can simplify the right-hand side of the lower bound. Together, we get the following
minimax lower bound, matching the upper bound in Corollary 4.
Corollary 6. If there exist constants c, C > 0, such that n ≥ c(eεS)/lnS and lnn ≤ C lnS, then
sup
P∈MS
inf
d̂ε(P‖Qn)
sup
Q∈MS
EQ
[ ∣∣ d̂ε(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q) ∣∣2 ] & eεS
n lnn
. (13)
2.2 Estimating dε(P‖Q) from samples
We now consider the general case where P = PQ,D and Q = PQ,D′ are both unknown, and we access
them through samples. We propose sampling a random number of samples N1 ∼ Poi (n) and N2 ∼
Poi (n) from each distribution, respectively. Define the empirical distributions Pn = [pˆ1, . . . , pˆS ]
and Qn = [qˆ1, . . . , qˆS ] as in the previous section. From the proof of Theorem 1, we get the same
sample complexity for the plug-in estimator: If n ≥ eεS and S ≥ 2, we have
sup
P,Q∈MS
EQ
[ |dε(Pn‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)|2 ]  eεS
n
. (14)
Using the same two-step process, we construct an estimator that improves upon this parametric
rate of plug-in estimator.
2.2.1 Estimator for dε(P‖Q)
We present an estimator using similar techniques as in Algorithm 1, but there are several challenges
in moving to a multivariate case. The multivariate function f(x, y) = [x− eεy]+ in non-smooth in
a region x = eεy. We first define a two-dimensional non-smooth set U(c1, c2) ⊂ [0, 1]× [0, eε] as
U(c1, c2) =
{
(p, eεq) : |p− eεq | ≤
√
(c1 + c2) lnn
n
(
√
p+
√
eεq), p ∈ [0, 1], q ∈ [0, 1]
}
, (15)
where 0 < c2 < c1. As before, the plug-in estimator is good enough in the smooth regime,
i.e. (p, eεq) /∈ U(c1, c2).
We construct a polynomial approximation of this function with order K, in this non-smooth
regime. We will set K = c3 lnn to achieve the optimal tradeoff. We split the samples randomly into
four partitions, each having an independent and identical distribution of Poi (n) samples, two from
the multinomial distributions P and other two from Q. See Algorithm 2 for a formal definition.
We use one set of samples to identify the regime, and the other for estimation.
case 1: For (x, eεy) ∈ [0, (2c1 lnn)/n]2.
A straightforward polynomial approximation of [x − eεy]+ on [0, (2c1 lnn)/n]2 cannot achieve
approximation error smaller than (1/K)((2c1 lnn)/n). As K = c3 lnn, this gives a bias of 1/n for
each symbol in [S], resulting in total bias of S/n. This requires n  S to achieve arbitrary small
error, as opposed to n  S/ lnS which is what we are targeting. This is due to the fact that we
are requiring multivariate approximation, and the bias is dominated by the worst case y for each
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Algorithm 2 Differential Privacy (DP) estimator
Input: target privacy ε ∈ R+, query Q, neighboring databases (D,D′),
samples from PQ,D and PQ,D′ , degree K ∈ Z+, constants c1, c2 ∈ R+, expected sample size 2n
Output: estimate d̂ε,K,c1,c2(Pn‖Qn) of dε(PQ,D‖PQ,D′)
P ← PQ,D, Q← PQ,D′
Draw four independent sample sizes: N1,1, N1,2, N2,1, N2,2 ∼ Poi (n)
Sample from PQ,D: {Xi,1}N1,1i=1 ∈ [S]N1,1 and {Xi,2}N1,2i=1 ∈ [S]N1,2
Sample from PQ,D′ : {Yi,1}N2,1i=1 ∈ [S]N2,1 and {Yi,2}N2,2i=1 ∈ [S]N2,2
pˆi,j ← |{`∈[N1,j ]:X`,j=i}|n and qˆi,j ←
|{`∈[N2,j ]:Y`,j=i}|
n for all i ∈ [S] and j ∈ {1, 2}
Pn,1 ← [pˆ1,1, . . . , pˆS,1], Pn,2 ← [pˆ1,2, . . . , pˆS,2], Qn,1 ← [qˆ1,1, . . . , qˆS,1] and Qn,2 ← [qˆ1,2, . . . , qˆS,2]
for i = 1 to S do
δi ←

0 , if pˆi,1 − eεqˆi,1 < −
√
(c1+c2) lnn
n (
√
pˆi,1 +
√
eεqˆi,1)
pˆi,2 − eεqˆi,2 , if pˆi,1 − eεqˆi,1 >
√
(c1+c2) lnn
n (
√
pˆi,1 +
√
eεqˆi,1)
D˜
(1)
K (pˆi,2, qˆi,2) , if pˆi,1 + e
εqˆi,1 <
c1 lnn
n
D˜
(2)
K (pˆi,2, qˆi,2; pˆi,1, qˆi,1) , if (pˆi,1, e
εqˆi,1) ∈ U(c1, c2), pˆi,1 + eεqˆi,1 ≥ c1 lnnn
end for
d̂ε,K,c1,c2(Pn‖Qn)← 0 ∨ (1 ∧
∑S
i=1 δi)
x. If y is fixed, as in the case of univariate approximation in Lemma 15, the bias would have been
(1/K)
√
(eεy2c1 lnn)/n, with y = qi, where total bias scales as
√
S/n lnn when summed over all
symbols i.
Our strategy is to use the decomposition [x−eεy]+ = (√x+√eεy) [√x−√eεy]+. Each function
can be approximated up to a bias of (1/K)
√
(lnn)/n, and the dominant term in the bias becomes
(1/K)
√
(eεqi lnn)/n. This gives the desired bias. Concretely, we use two bivariate polynomials
uK(x, y) and vK(x, y) to approximate
√
x+
√
y and [
√
x−√y]+ in [0, 1]2, respectively. Namely,
sup
(x,y)∈[0,1]2
∣∣uK(x, y)− (√x+√y)∣∣ = inf
P∈poly2K
sup
(x′,y′)∈[0,1]2
∣∣∣P (x′, y′)− (√x′ +√y′)∣∣∣ , and (16)
sup
(x,y)∈[0,1]2
∣∣vK(x, y)− [√x−√y]+∣∣ = inf
P∈poly2K
sup
(x′,y′)∈[0,1]2
∣∣∣P (x′, y′)− [√x′ −√y′]+∣∣∣ . (17)
Then denote h2K(x, y) = uK(x, y)vK(x, y) − uK(0, 0)vK(0, 0). For (x, eεy) ∈ [0, (2c1 lnn)/n]2,
define
D
(1)
K (x, y) =
2c1 lnn
n
h2K
(
xn
2c1 lnn
,
eεyn
2c1 lnn
)
. (18)
In practice, one can use the best Chebyshev polynomial expansion to achieve the same uniform
error rate, efficiently [MNS13].
case 2: For (x, eεy) ∈ U(c1, c1) and x+ eεy ≥ (c1 lnn)/2n.
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We utilize the best polynomial approximation of |t| on [−1, 1] with order K. Denote it as
RK(t) =
∑K
j=0 rjt
j . Define
D
(2)
K (x, y; pˆi,1, qˆi,1) =
1
2
K∑
j=0
rjW
−j+1(eεy − x)j + x− e
εy
2
, (19)
where W =
√
(8c1 lnn)/n
(√
pˆi,1 + eεqˆi,1
)
. Finally, we use second part of samples to construct
unbiased estimator for D
(1)
K (x, y) and D
(2)
K (x, y; pˆi,1, qˆi,1) by Lemma 1. Namely,
E
[
D˜
(1)
K (pˆi,2, qˆi,2)
]
= D
(1)
K (p, q) , (20)
and
E
[
D˜
(2)
K (pˆi,2, qˆi,2; pˆi,1, qˆi,1)|pˆi,1, qˆi,1
]
= D
(2)
K (p, q; pˆi,1, qˆi,1) . (21)
These unbiased estimator are easy to construct by using following lemma.
Lemma 1. [Wit87, Exercise 2.8] For any r, s ≥ 1, r, s ∈ Z, (npˆ, nqˆ) Poi (np)× Poi (nq), we have
E
r−1∏
i=0
(
pˆ− i
n
) s−1∏
j=0
(
qˆ − j
n
) = prqs . (22)
The explicit formula for the unbiased estimators can be found in Eq. (181) and Eq. (188).
2.2.2 Minimax optimal upper bound
We provide an upper bound on the error achieved by the proposed estimator. The analysis uses
similar techniques as the proof of Theorem 3. However, it is not an immediate corollary, and we
provide a proof in Section 4.5.
Theorem 7. Suppose there exists a constant C > 0 such that lnn ≤ C lnS. Then there exist
constants c1, c2 and c3 that only depends on C and ε such that
sup
P,Q∈MS
EP×Q
[ ∣∣ d̂ε,K,c1,c2(Pn‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q) ∣∣2 ] . eεSn lnn , (23)
for K = c3 lnn where d̂ε,K,c1,c2 is defined in Algorithm 2.
It follows from the proof of Theorem 5 that
inf
d̂ε(Pn‖Qn)
sup
P,Q∈MS
EP×Q
[ ∣∣ d̂ε(Pn‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q) ∣∣2 ] & eεS
n lnn
.
Together, the above upper and lower bounds prove that the proposed estimator in Algorithm 2
is minimax optimal and cannot be improved upon in terms of sample complexity. We want to
emphasize that we do not require to know the size of the support S, as opposed to exiting methods
in [DWW+18], which requires collecting enough samples to identify the support. Comparing it to
the error rate of plug-in estimator in Theorem 1, this minimax rate of eεS/(n lnn) demonstrates
the effective sample size amplification holds; with n samples, a sophisticated estimator can achieve
the error rate equivalent to a plug-in estimator with n lnn samples.
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3 Experiments
We implemented both plug-in estimator and Algorithm 2. Note that the coefficients of bivariate
polynomial uK(x, y), vK(x, y) on [0, 1]
2 and RK(t) on [−1, 1] are independent of data and ε. We
pre-compute the coefficients and look them up from a table when running our estimators. Using
numerical computation provided by Chebfun toolbox [DHT14], we obtained the coefficients of
RK by Remez algorithm, and the coefficients of bivariate polynomial uK , vK by lowpass filtered
Chebyshev expansion [MNS13]. The time complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(n ln2 n). We compare the
proposed Algorithm 2 and the plug-in estimator on synthetic data (Section 3.1), and demonstrate
the (ε, δ) regions for some of the popular differential privacy mechanisms and their variations
(Section 3.2). All experiments are done on a Macbook Pro with Intel R© CoreTM i5 processor and 8
GB memory. Our estimator is implemented in Python 3.6. We provide the code as a supplementary
material.
3.1 Synthetic experiments
Although in the analysis we make conservative choices of the constants c1, c2 and c3, Algorithm 2
is not sensitive to those choices in practice and we fix them to be c1 = 4, c2 = 0.1 and c3 = 1.5 in
the experiments. The degree of polynomial approximation is chosen as K = bc3 ln(n)c. Figure 1
illustrates the Mean Square Error (MSE) for estimating dε(P‖Q) between uniform distribution
P and Zipf distribution Q, where the support size is fixed to be S = 100, Zipf(α) ∝ 1/iα, and
α = −0.6 for i ∈ [S]. The ε is fixed to be ε = 0.4. Each data point represents 100 random trials,
with standard error (SE) error bars smaller than the plot marker. This suggests that the Algorithm
2 consistently improves upon the plug-in estimator, as predicted by Theorem 7.
MSE
sample size n
Figure 1: The proposed minimax optimal estimator in Algorithm 2 consistently improves upon the
plug-in estimator on synthetic data.
3.2 Detecting violation of differential privacy with Algorithm 2
We demonstrate how we can use Algorithm 2 to detect mechanisms with false claim of DP guaran-
tees on four types of mechanisms: Report Noisy Max [DR+14], Histogram [Dwo06], Sparse Vector
Technique [LSL17] and Mixture of Truncated Geometric Mechanism. Following the experimental
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set-up of [DWW+18], the test query and databases defining (Q,D,D′) are chosen by some heuris-
tics, shown in Table 1. However, unlike the approach from [DWW+18], we do not require to know
the size of the support S, we don’t have to specify candidate bad events E ⊆ [S], and we can
estimate general approximate DP with δ > 0. Throughout all the experiments, we fix c1 = 4,
c2 = 0.1, c3 = 0.9, and the mean of number of samples n = 100000. For the examples in Report
Noisy Max, Histogram, and Sparse Vector Technique, we compose 5 and 10 queries together to
form a one giant query. There are several categories of queries and databases to be tested, each
represented by the true answer of the 5 queries in the table. When testing, we test all categories,
and report the largest estimate δˆ for each given ε. For those faulty mechanisms, Algorithm 2 also
provides a certificate in the form of a set T ⊆ [S] such that [P (T )− eε0Q(T )]+ − δ0 > 0.
Table 1: Database categories and samples [DWW+18]
Category [Q1(D), . . . ,Q5(D)] [Q1(D′), . . . ,Q5(D′)]
One Above [1, 1, 1, 1, 1] [2, 1, 1, 1, 1]
One Below [1, 1, 1, 1, 1] [0, 1, 1, 1, 1]
One Above Rest Below [1, 1, 1, 1, 1] [2, 0, 0, 0, 0]
One Below Rest Above [1, 1, 1, 1, 1] [0, 2, 2, 2, 2]
Half Half [1, 1, 1, 1, 1] [0, 0, 0, 2, 2]
All Above & All Below [1, 1, 1, 1, 1] [2, 2, 2, 2, 2]
X Shape [1, 1, 1, 1, 1] [0, 0, 1, 1, 1]
Report Noisy Max. For privacy budget ε0, Report Noisy Argmax with Laplace noise (RNA+Lap)
adds independent Lap(2/ε0) noise to query answers Q(D) and return the index of the largest noisy
query answer. Report Noisy Argmax with Exponential noise (RNA+Exp) adds Exp(2/ε0) noise
instead of Laplace noise. Their claimed level of (ε0)-DP is correctly guaranteed [DR
+14, Claim 3.9
and Theorem 3.10]. On the other hand, Report Noisy Max with Laplace noise (RNM+Lap) or Report
Noisy Max with Exponential noise (RNM+Exp) return the largest noisy answer itself, instead of
its index. This reveals more information than intended, leading to violation of claimed (ε0, 0)-DP.
Figure 2 shows (ε, δ) regions for the above variations of noisy max mechanisms. As expected, for
each ε0, RNA+Lap and RNA+Exp satisfy (ε0, 0)-DP, whereas RNM+Lap and RNM+Exp have
δˆ > 0.
Histogram. For privacy budget ε0, Histogram takes histogram queries as input, adds independent
Lap(1/ε0) noise to each query answers, and output the randomized query answers directly, which is
proved to be (ε0, 0)-DP [DR
+14]. As a comparison, Histogram with incorrect noise adds incorrect
noise Lap(ε0). Note that as we use histogram queries, we require Q(D) and Q(D′) to be different
in at most one element, which is tested on One Above and One Below samples as shown in Table 1.
With the setting of privacy budget ε0 = 0.5, Figure 3 left panel shows that the incorrect histogram
is likely to be (1/ε0, 0)-DP. Both mechanisms claim (0.5, 0)-DP, but the figure shows that the
incorrect mechanism ensures (1/0.5, 0)-DP instead.
Sparse Vector Technique (SVT). We consider original sparse vector technique mechanism
SVT [LSL17], and its variations iSVT1 [SCM14], iSVT2 [CXZX15], and iSVT3 [LC14]. They are
discussed in Section 1 and also studied and tested in [DWW+18]. With the setting of privacy
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εδˆ
ε
δˆ
ε
δˆ
ε
δˆ
Figure 2: Estimate δˆ from Algorithm 2 of δ given ε, and privacy budget ε0 for noisy max mecha-
nisms. Each point is showing an average over 10 random trials with standard error.
budget ε0 = 0.5, Figure 3 shows that SVT is likely to be (ε0, 0)-DP. However, iSVT1 and iSVT2
are not likely to be pure differentially private for ε ∈ [0, 1] with budget ε0 = 0.5. As discussed in
[LSL17], iSVT3 is in fact ( (1+6N)4 ε0, 0)-DP, where N is the bound of number of trues in the output
Boolean vector and set as N = 1 in this experiment. Figure 3 middle panel shows that with δˆ = 0,
ε is likely to be in the range [0.8, 0.9], which verifies the theoretic guarantee.
Mixture of Truncated Geometric Mechanism (MTGM) With privacy budget ε0, Truncated
Geometric Mechanism (TGM) proposed by [GRS12] is provably to be (ε0, 0)-DP. With probability
privacy budget ε0 and δ0 ∈ [0, 1], Mixture of Truncated Geometric Mechanism (MTGM) outputs
the original query answer with probability δ0, and outputs the randomized query answer with
probability 1 − δ0. MTGM can be proved to be (ε0, δ0)-DP by composition theorem. Note that
TGM and MTGM both take single counting query as query function Q. In the experiment, we
consider the single counting query with range {0, 1, 2, 3}. Figure 3 right panel confirms that MTGM
satisfied the claimed (ε0, δ0) differential privacy.
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εδˆ
ε
δˆ
ε
δˆ
Figure 3: Estimates of δ given ε, and privacy budget ε0 for histogram (left), SVT mechanisms
(middle), Mixture of Truncated Geometric Mechanisms (right). Each point represents 10 random
trials with standard error bars.
4 Proof
4.1 Auxiliary lemmas
4.1.1 Lemmas on Poisson distribution
Lemma 2 ([MU05, Exercise 4.7]). If X ∼ Poi (λ), then for any δ > 0, we have
P
(
X ≥ (1 + δ)λ
)
≤
( eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
)λ ≤ e−δ2λ/3 ∨ e−δλ/3 , (24)
P
(
X ≤ (1− δ)λ
)
≤
( e−δ
(1− δ)1−δ
)λ ≤ e−δ2λ/2 . (25)
Lemma 3 ([MU05, Exercise 4.14]). Suppose X ∼ Poi (λ1), Y ∼ Poi (λ2), and Z = αX + Y , where
α > 1 is a constant. Then E[Z] = αλ1 + λ2, and for any δ > 0, we have
P
(
Z ≥ (1 + δ)(αλ1 + λ2)
)
≤ e−δ2(αλ1+λ2)/3 ∨ e−δ(αλ1+λ2)/3 , (26)
P
(
Z ≤ (1− δ)(αλ1 + λ2)
)
≤ e−δ2(αλ1+λ2)/2 . (27)
Lemma 4. Suppose nqˆ ∼ Poi (nq), then
E
[
[qˆ − q]+ ] ∈ { q e−nq , 0 ≤ q ≤ 1n[√ q
4n ,
√
q
2n
]
, q ≥ 1n
(28)
Hence,
1
2
(
q ∧
√
q
n
)
≤ E[[qˆ − q]+] ≤
(
q ∧
√
q
n
)
. (29)
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Proof. Let λ = nq, then
E
[
[qˆ − q]+ ] = 1
n
∞∑
k=bλc+1
λke−λ
k!
(k − λ)
=
1
n
∞∑
k=bλc+1
λke−λ
k!
k − 1
n
∞∑
k=bλc+1
λke−λ
k!
λ
=
1
n
λ
∞∑
k=bλc
λke−λ
k!
− 1
n
λ
∞∑
k=bλc+1
λke−λ
k!
=
λbλc+1e−λ
n bλc!
For λ = nq ≤ 1, this is qe−nq. For λ ≥ 1, we use Stirling’s approximation to get
λbλc+1e−λ
n bλc! ∈
[1
e
,
1√
2pi
]
× λ
bλc+1 e−λ
n bλcbλc+ 12 e−bλc
.
As λ
bλc+12 e−λ
bλcbλc+12 e−bλc
is in [1 , 1.12] for λ ≥ 1, this gives the desired bound. 
Lemma 5. Suppose nqˆ ∼ Poi (nq), then
E
[
[p− eεqˆ]+ − [p− eεq]+] ≤ eε min { q, e−εp,√ q
n
,
√
e−εp
n
}
. (30)
Proof.
E
[
[p− eεqˆ]+ − [p− eεq]+ ] = E[ (p− eεqˆ) + |p− eεqˆ|
2
− (p− e
εq) + |p− eεq|
2
]
=
1
2
(
E
[ |p− eεqˆ| ]− |p− eεq|) .
If p ≥ eεq, then
1
2
(
E
[ |p− eεqˆ| ]− |p− eεq|) = 1
2
(
E
[ |p− eεqˆ| − (p− eεq) ])
=
1
2
(
E
[
(p− eεqˆ)− (p− eεq) + 2[eεqˆ − p]+ ])
= E
[
[eεqˆ − p]+ ]
≤ eεE[ [qˆ − q]+ ]
≤ eε
(
q ∧
√
q
n
)
,
where the second equality is because of the fact that x = [x]+ − [−x]+ and |x| = [x]+ + [−x]+,
the first inequality follows from the fact that [x]+ is monotone, and the last inequality follows from
Lemma 4.
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If p < eεq, then
1
2
(
E
[ |p− eεqˆ| ]− |p− eεq|) = 1
2
(
E
[ |p− eεqˆ| − (eεq − p) ])
=
1
2
(
E
[
(eεqˆ − p)− (eεq − p) + 2[p− eεqˆ]+ ])
= E
[
[p− eεqˆ]+ ] ,
Now we construct new random variable pˆ by nqˆ = ne−εpˆ + Z, where Z is independent of pˆ
and Z ∼ Poi (n(q − e−εp)). Hence, e−εpˆ ≤ qˆ with probability one. And the marginal distribution
satisfies ne−εpˆ ∼ Poi (ne−εp). We have
E
[
[e−εp− qˆ]+ ] ≤ E[ [e−εp− e−εpˆ]+ ]
≤
(
e−εp ∧
√
e−εp
n
)
,
where the first inequality follows from that fact that [x]+ is monotone, and the last inequality
follows from Lemma 4. 
Lemma 6. Suppose nqˆ ∼ Poi (nq), then for any p and q, we have
Var
(
[p− eε qˆ]+ ) . eεp
n
. (31)
Proof. Case 1: If nq < 1 and e−εp ≥ q or if nq ≥ 1 and ne−εp > bnqc − 1:
Var
(
[p− eεqˆ]+ ) = inf
a
E
(
[p− eεqˆ]+ − a )2
≤ E( [p− eεqˆ]+ − [p− eεq]+ )2
= E
( (p− eεqˆ)− (p− eεq)
2
+
|p− eεqˆ| − |p− eεq|
2
)2
≤ E( eε|qˆ − q|
2
+
∣∣|p− eεqˆ| − |p− eεq|∣∣
2
)2
≤ e2εE( |qˆ − q|
2
+
|qˆ − q|
2
)2
= e2εE
(
qˆ − q )2
=
e2εq
n
≤ e
εp
n
,
where the last step follows from the assumption that e−εp ≥ q.
Case 2: If nq < 1 and e−εp < q or if nq ≥ 1 and ne−εp < 1 :
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In both cases, ne−εp < 1, and we have
[ne−εp− nqˆ]+ =
{
ne−εp w.p. e−nq
0 w.p. 1− e−nq ,
which is a Bernoulli random variable. The variance of it is
Var
(
[p− eεqˆ]+) = e2ε
n2
Var
(
[ne−εp− nqˆ]+)
= p2(1− e−nq)e−nq
≤ p2 < e
εp
n
,
where we used the assumption that ne−εp < 1.
Case 3: If nq ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ ne−εp ≤ bnqc − 1:
Let λ = nq, and denote the random variable X ∼ Poi (λ).
If 1 ≤ ne−εp ≤ bnqc − 1, we know from Lemma 2 that
P
(
X ≤ ne−εp) ≤ e−DKL(ne−εp‖nq) , (32)
where DKL(k‖m) , m− k + k ln(k/m).
We have
E
(
[p− eεqˆ]+ )2 = bne−εpc∑
k=0
(
p− eε k
n
)2(λke−λ
k!
)
= p2P
(
X ≤ ne−εp)− 2eεpqP(X ≤ ne−εp− 1)
+
e2εq
n
P
(
X ≤ ne−εp− 1)+ e2εq2P(X ≤ ne−εp− 2)
= p2P
(
X ≤ ne−εp)− 2eεpqP(X ≤ ne−εp)+ 2eεpqP(X = bne−εpc)
+
e2εq
n
P
(
X ≤ ne−εp)− e2εq
n
P
(
X = bne−εpc)
+e2εq2P
(
X ≤ ne−εp)− e2εq2P(X = bne−εpc)− e2εq2P(X = bne−εpc − 1)
= (p2 − 2eεpq + e
2εq
n
+ e2εq2)P
(
X ≤ ne−εp)
+(2eεpq − e
2εq
n
− e2εq2 − e
2εqbne−εpc
n
)P
(
X = bne−εpc)
.
(
(eεq − p)2 ∨ e
2εq
n
)
e−DKL(ne
−εp‖nq) .
Let y = q/(e−εp), as 1 ≤ ne−εp ≤ bnqc − 1, we know y > 1.
We have
e2εq
n
e−DKL(ne
−εp‖nq) =
eεpy
n
e−ne
−εp(y−1−ln y)
. e
εp
n
,
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where we used the assumption that ne−εp ≥ 1 and the inequality that ye−(y−1−ln y) is bounded by
some constant for y > 1.
We have
(eεq − p)2e−DKL(ne−εp‖nq) = (y − 1)2p2e−ne−εp(y−1−ln y)
. e
εp
n
,
where we used the assumption that ne−εp ≥ 1 and the inequality that (y − 1)2e−x(y−1−ln y) . 1/x
for x, y > 1.
It suffices to show that fy(x) = lnx− x(y− 1− ln y) + 2 ln(y− 1) is bounded by some constant
for x, y > 1. Indeed, when y− 1− ln y > 1, f ′y(x) = 1/x− (y− 1− ln y) < 0. fy(x) is monotonically
decreasing and fy(x) < fy(1) = 2 ln(y−1)−y+1+ln y, which is bounded. When y−1−ln y < 1, fy(x)
attains maximum at x = 1/(y−1−ln y). In this case, we have fy(x) ≤ 2 ln(y−1)−ln(y−1−ln y)−1,
which is also bounded.

Lemma 7. Suppose nqˆ ∼ Poi (nq). Then,
P
(
eεqˆ /∈ U(e2εq; c1, c1)
) ≤ 2
n−c1e−ε/3
≤ 2
n−c1/3
, (33)
and
P (qˆ /∈ U(eεq; c1, c1)) ≤ 2
n−c1/3
. (34)
Proof. The second inequality is exactly [JHW18, Lemma 1]. We now prove the first inequality.
If q ≤ c1e−ε lnnn , we have
P
(
eεqˆ /∈ U(e2εq : c1, c1)
)
= P
(
nqˆ ≥ 2c1e−ε lnn
)
≤ P (Poi (c1e−ε lnn) ≥ 2c1e−ε lnn)
≤ e− c1e
−ε lnn
3 ,
where we applied Lemma 2 in the last inequality.
If q > c1e
−ε lnn
n , we have
P
(
eεqˆ /∈ U(e2εq; c1, c1)
)
= P
(
eεqˆ > eεq +
√
c1eεq lnn
n
)
+ P
(
eεqˆ < eεq −
√
c1eεq lnn
n
)
≤ P
(
Poi (nq) > nq +
√
c1qe−εn lnn
)
+ P
(
Poi (nq) < nq −
√
c1qe−εn lnn
)
≤ e−
c1e
−ε lnn
nq
nq
3 + e
− c1e−ε lnn
nq
nq
2
≤ 2
nc1e−ε/3
.

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4.1.2 Lemmas on the best polynomial approximation
The first-order and second-order symmetric difference with function ϕ(x) =
√
x(1− x) are defined
as
∆hϕf(x) , f(x+
hϕ(x)
2
)− f(x− hϕ(x)
2
) , (35)
and
∆2hϕf(x) = f(x+ hϕ(x))− 2f(x) + f(x− hϕ(x)) , (36)
respectively.
For function f(x) with domain [0, 1], the first-order Ditzian-Totik modulus of smoothness is
defined as
ω1ϕ(f, t) , sup
0<h≤t
‖∆1hϕf(x)‖∞ , (37)
and the second-order Ditzian-Totik modulus of smoothness is defined as
ω2ϕ(f, t) , sup
0<h≤t
‖∆2hϕf(x)‖∞ . (38)
The following lemma upper bounds the best polynomial approximation error by the Ditzian-Totik
moduli.
Lemma 8 ([Dit87, Theorem 7.2.1 and 12.1.1]). There exists a constant M(r) > 0 such that for
any function f ∈ C[0, 1],
∆L[f ; [0, 1]] ≤ M(r)ωrϕ(f,
1
L
) , L > r , (39)
where ∆L[f ; I] denotes the distance of the function f to the space polyL in the uniform norm ‖·‖∞, I
on I ⊂ R. Moreover, if f(x) : [0, 1]2 7→ R, we have
∆L[f ; [0, 1]
2] ≤ Mωr[0,1]2(f,
1
L
) , L > r , (40)
where M is independent of f and L, and ∆L[f ; [0, 1]
2] denotes the distance of the function f to the
space poly2L in the uniform norm on [0, 1]
2.
Lemma 9. For f(x) = [p − eε2x∆]+, for some ∆ > 0, p ∈ [0, 2eε∆], x ∈ [0, 1], and any integer
K ≥ 1,
ω2ϕ(f,K
−1) =

p p2eε∆ ≤ 11+K2√
p(2eε∆−p)
K
1
1+K2
≤ p2eε∆ ≤ K
2
1+K2
eε∆− p K2
1+K2
≤ p2eε∆ ≤ 1
. min
{
p ,
√
p(2eε∆− p)
K
, eε∆− p
}
,
where ω2ϕ(f, t) is defined in Eq. (38).
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Proof. Let g(x) := |p− 2eε∆x|.
∆2hϕf(x) = [p− 2eε∆(x+ hϕ(x))]+ − 2[p− 2eε∆x]+ + [p− 2eε∆(x− hϕ(x))]+
=
(
p− 2eε∆(x+ hϕ(x)))− 2(p− 2eε∆x)+ (p− 2eε∆(x− hϕ(x)))
2
+∣∣p− 2eε∆(x+ hϕ(x))∣∣− 2∣∣p− 2eε∆x∣∣+ ∣∣p− 2eε∆(x− hϕ(x))∣∣
2
=
1
2
∆2hϕg(x)
Hence,
ω2ϕ(f, t) =
1
2
ω2ϕ(g, t) (41)
It follows from [JHW18, Lemma 12] that, for some ∆ > 0, p ∈ [0, 2eε∆], x ∈ [0, 1] and any
integer K ≥ 1, we have:
ω2ϕ(g,K
−1) =

2p p2eε∆ ≤ 11+K2
2
√
p(2eε∆−p)
K
1
1+K2
≤ p2eε∆ ≤ K
2
1+K2
2eε∆− p K2
1+K2
≤ p2eε∆ ≤ 1
,
which implies the desired bound.

Lemma 10. Suppose f(x) = [
√
x−√a]+, x ∈ [0, 1] and a ∈ [0, 1]. Then
ω1ϕ(f, t) ≤
t√
2
. (42)
Similarly, suppose f(x) = [
√
a−√x]+, x ∈ [0, 1] and a ∈ [0, 1]. Then
ω1ϕ(f, t) ≤
t√
2
. (43)
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Proof. Let g(x) = |√x−√a|.
∆1hϕf(x) =
∣∣∣∣f(x+ hϕ(x)2 )− f(x− hϕ(x)2 )
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
[√
x+
hϕ(x)
2
−√a
]+
−
[√
x− hϕ(x)
2
−√a
]+∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣12
(∣∣∣∣∣
√
x+
hϕ(x)
2
−√a
∣∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣
√
x− hϕ(x)
2
−√a
∣∣∣∣∣
)
+√
x+ hϕ(x)2 −
√
x− hϕ(x)2
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
∇1hϕg(x) +
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣
√
x+
hϕ(x)
2
−
√
x− hϕ(x)
2
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∇1hϕg(x) +
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣ hϕ(x)√x+ hϕ(x)/2 +√x− hϕ(x)/2
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
∇1hϕg(x) +
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣ hϕ(x)√x+ hϕ(x)/2 + x− hϕ(x)/2
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
∇1hϕg(x) +
h
√
1− x
2
√
2
≤ t√
2
,
where we used the fact that
√
x+
√
y ≤ x+ y and [JHW18, Lemma 11] for smoothness of g. 
Lemma 11 ([HJW16, Lemma 27]). Let pn(x) =
∑n
v=0 avx
v be a polynomial of degree at most n
such that |pn(x)| ≤ A for x ∈ [a, b]. Then
1. If a+ b 6= 0, then
|av| ≤ 27n/2A
∣∣∣∣a+ b2
∣∣∣∣−v (∣∣∣∣b+ ab− a
∣∣∣∣n + 1) , v = 0, 1, · · · , n . (44)
2. If a+ b = 0, then
|av| ≤ Ab−v(
√
(2) + 1)n , v = 0, 1, · · · , n . (45)
4.1.3 Lemmas on the uniformly unbiased minimum variance unbiased estimator
Lemma 12 ([JHW18, Lemma 18]). Suppose nX ∼ Poi (np), p ≥ 0, q ≥ 0. Then, the estimator
gj,q(X) ,
j∑
k=0
(
j
k
)
(−q)j−k
k−1∏
h=0
(
X − h
n
)
(46)
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is the unique uniformly minimum variance unbiased estimator for (p − q)j, j ≥ 0, j ∈ N, and its
second moment is given by
E
[(
gj,q(X)
)2]
=
j∑
k=0
(
j
k
)2
(p− q)2(j−k) p
kk!
nk
= j!
( p
n
)j
Lj
(
−n(p− q)
2
p
)
assuming p > 0 ,(47)
where Lm(x) stands for the Laguerre polynomial with order m, which is defined as:
Lm(x) =
m∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
(−x)k
k!
. (48)
If M ≥ max
{
n(p−q)2
p , j
}
, we have
E
[(
gj,q(X)
)2] ≤ (2Mp
n
)j
. (49)
When k = 0,
∏k−1
h=0
(
X − hn
)
, 1. When p = 0, gj,q(X) ≡ (−q)j, E [gj,q(X)]2 ≡ q2j.
Lemma 13. Suppose (npˆ, nqˆ) ∼ Poi (np) × Poi (nq). Then the following estimator using (pˆ, qˆ) is
the unique uniformly minimum unbiased estimator for (eεq − p)j, j ≥ 0, j ∈ Z:
Aˆj(pˆ, qˆ) =
j∑
k=0
(
j
k
) k−1∏
i=0
(
qˆ − i
n
)
eεk(−1)j−k
j−k∏
m=0
(
pˆ− m
n
)
. (50)
Furthermore,
EAˆ2j ≤
(
2(eεq − p)2 ∨ 8j(e
2εq ∨ p)
n
)j
. (51)
Proof. It follows from [JHW18, Lemma 19] and binomial theorem that Aˆj(pˆ, qˆ) is the unique uni-
formly minimum variance unbiased estimator for (eεq − p)j . Now we show EAˆ2j is bounded.
It follows from binomial theorem again that for any fixed r > 0,
(eεq − p)j = (eεq − r + r − p)j (52)
=
j∑
k=0
(
j
k
)
(eεq − r)k(−1)j−k(p− r)j−k . (53)
The following estimator is also unbiased for estimating (eεq − p)j ,
j∑
k=0
eεkgk, r
eε
(qˆ)(−1)j−kgj−k,r(pˆ) , (54)
where gi,q(pˆ) is defined in Lemma 12.
Define M1 =
n(q− r
eε
)2
p ∨ j, M2 = n(p−r)
2
p ∨ j, M = 2(eεq − p)2 ∨ 8j(e
2εq∨p)
n and set r =
eεq+p
2 .
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Denote ‖X‖2 =
√
E(X − EX)2 for random variable X. It follows from Lemma 12 that
‖Aˆj‖2 ≤
j∑
k=0
(
j
k
)
eεk‖gk, r
eε
(qˆ)‖2 · ‖gj−k,r(pˆ)‖2
≤
j∑
k=0
(
j
k
)
eεk
(
2M1q
n
)k/2(2M2p
n
)(j−k)/2
=
(
eε
√
2M1q
n
+
√
2M2p
n
)j
=
(√
(eεq − p)2
2
∨ 2je
2εq
n
+
√
(eεq − p)2
2
∨ 2jp
n
)j
= M j/2 .

4.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Note that
EQ
[ |dε(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)|2 ] = ( S∑
i=1
EQ
[
[pi − eεqˆi]+
]− [pi − eεqi]+)2 + Var(dε(P‖Qn)) . (55)
We first claim the following upper bound for all P :
S∑
i=1
EQ
[
[pi − eεqˆi]+
]− [pi − eεqi]+ ≤ S∑
i=1
pi ∧
√
eεpi
n
, (56)
where the inequality follows from Lemma 5.
For the upper bound of the variance term in Eq. (55), we have
Var
(
dε(Pn‖Q)
)
=
S∑
i=1
Var
(
[pi − eεqˆi]+
)
.
S∑
i=1
eεqi
n
=
eε
n
, (57)
where the inequality follows from Lemma 6.
We next construct Q to get the lower bound. Let
qi =
{
e−εpi , i ∈ S+
1−Q(S+)
S−|S+| , i ∈ S−
(58)
where S+ is a set of indices satisfying Q(S+) =
∑
i∈S+ qi ≤ e−ε.
Note that each term in the bias of Eq. (55) is non-negative via Jensen’s inequality, which gives
S∑
i=1
EQ
[
[pi − eεqˆi]+
]− [pi − eεqi]+ ≥ eε ∑
i∈S+
EQ
[
[qi − qˆi]+
]
(59)
&
∑
i∈S+
{
pi ∧
√
eεpi
n
}
, (60)
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where we used Lemma 4. Note that we can choose Q such that |S+| = S/3. This implies the
desired lower bound when plugged into Eq. (55).
4.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Define good events, where our choice of the regimes are correct as
E ,
{
{i : qˆi,1 > U(pi; c1, c2)} ⊆ S+
}
∩
{
{i : qˆi,1 < U(pi; c1, c2)} ⊆ S−
}
∩
{
{i : qˆi,1 ∈ U(pi, c1, c2) ⊆ {i : qi ∈ U(pi, c1, c1)}}
}
, (61)
where S+ = {i : eεqi ≥ pi} and S− = {i : eεqi ≤ pi}. Decompose the error under the good events
as
E1 ,
∑
i∈I1
{
[pi − eεqˆi,2]+ − [pi − eεqi]+
}
, (62)
E2 ,
∑
i∈I2
{
D˜K(qˆi,2; pi)− [pi − eεqi]+
}
. (63)
where the indices of those regimes under the good event are
I1 , {i : qˆi,1 < U(pi; c1, c2), eεqi ≤ pi} (64)
I2 , {i : qˆi,1 ∈ U(pi; c1, c2), qi ∈ U(pi; c1, c1)} . (65)
We can bound the squared error as
E
[ (
d̂ε,K,c1,c2(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)
)2 ] ≤ E[ (d̂ε,K,c1,c2(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q))2 I(E) ] + P(Ec)
≤ E[(E1 + E2)2] + P(Ec)
≤ 2E[(E1)2] + 2E[(E2)2] + P(Ec) , (66)
The last term on the bad event is bounded by 3S/nβ as shown in the following lemma, and a
proof is provided in Section 4.3.1. This is a direct consequence of standard concentration inequality
for Poisson variables.
Lemma 14. Let β = min{ c223c1 ,
(c1−c2)2
4c1
,
(
√
c1−√c2)2
3 }, then for the good event E defined in (61),
P(Ec) ≤ 3S
nβ
. (67)
The first term is bounded by eε/n, as
E[(E1)2] = E[Var(E1|I1) + (E[E1|I1])2] = E[Var(E1|I1)] ≤
S∑
i=1
eε pi
n
≤ e
ε
n
(68)
where we used Lemma 6 and the fact that E[E1|I1] = 0 with probability one.
The second term is bounded by the following lemma, with a proof in Section 4.3.2.
25
Lemma 15. For nqˆ ∼ Poi (nq) and q ∈ U(p; c1, c1), there exists a universal constant B > 0 such
that ∣∣E[D˜K(qˆ; p)]− [p− eε q]+ ∣∣ . p ∧ 1
K
√
eε p c1 lnn
n
, and (69)
Var
(
D˜K(qˆ; p)
)
. B
K eε c1 lnn
n
(p+ eεq) , (70)
where D˜K(pˆ; q) is the uniformly minimum variance unbiased estimate (MVUE) defined in Eq. (9),
U(q, c1) is defined in Eq. (7), and K = c3 lnn for some c3 < c1.
We have
E[(E2)2] .
S∑
i=1
BKeεc1 lnn
n
(pi + e
εqi) +
( S∑
i=1
pi ∧ 1
K
√
eεpic1 lnn
n
)2
(71)
. c1 lnn
n1−c3 lnB
eε(eε + 1) +
( S∑
i=1
pi ∧
√
eεpic1
c23n lnn
)2
. (72)
Substituting bounds (72), (68) and (67), we get that
E
[ (
d̂ε,K,c1,c2(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)
)2 ] . c1 lnn
n1−c3 lnB
e2ε +
( S∑
i=1
pi ∧
√
eεpic1
c23n lnn
)2
+
S
nβ
(73)
where we use the fact that e
ε
n .
c1 lnn
n1−c3 lnB e
ε(eε + 1).
As lnn & lnS, one may choose c1 large enough to and let c2 = c1/2 to ensure that Snβ .
c1 lnn
n1−c3 lnB e
2ε. As lnn . ln
(
e−ε
∑S
i=1
√
eεpi ∧ pi
√
n lnn
)
, one may choose c3 small enough to ensure
c1 lnn
n1−c3 lnB e
2ε .
(∑S
i=1 pi ∧
√
eεpic1
c23n lnn
)2
. The worst case of P result is proved upon noting
S∑
i=1
pi ∧
√
eεpi
n lnn
≤
S∑
i=1
√
eεpi
n lnn
x (74)
Note that in the worst case of P , we do not require lnn & lnS, as we can take c1 large enough
and c2 = c1/2 to ensure
S
nβ
. eεSn lnn .
4.3.1 Proof of Lemma 14
Let E1 =
{
{i : qˆi,1 > U(pi; c1, c2)} ⊆ S+
}
, E2 =
{
{i : qˆi,1 < U(pi; c1, c2)} ⊆ S−
}
and E3 =
{
{i :
qˆi,1 ∈ U(pi, c1, c2) ⊆ {i : qi ∈ U(pi, c1, c1)}}
}
. We first show P(Ec1) ≤ Sn−β for β ≤ (c2)2/(3c1).
P(Ec1) = P
( S⋃
i=1
{qˆi,1 > U(pi; c1, c2), eεqi < pi}
)
≤ S max
i∈S
P({qˆi,1 > U(pi; c1, c2), eεqi < pi})
= S max
i∈S
P({Poi (nqi) > nU(pi; c1, c2), qi < e−εpi})
≤ S max
i∈S
P({Poi (ne−εpi) > nU(pi; c1, c2)})
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If pi ≤ (c1eε lnn)/n, it follows from Lemma 2 that
P({Poi (ne−εpi) > nU(pi; c1, c2)}) = P({Poi (ne−εpi) > (c1 + c2) lnn})
≤ P({Poi (c1 lnn) > (c1 + c2) lnn})
≤ e−
c22
3c1
lnn
.
If pi > (c1e
ε lnn)/n, it follows from Lemma 2 that
P({Poi (ne−εpi) > nU(pi; c1, c2)}) = P({Poi (ne−εpi) > ne−εpi +
√
c2e−εpin lnn})
≤ e− c2 lnn3 .
Together, these bounds imply that P(Ec1) ≤ Sn−β.
Next, we show P(Ec2) ≤ Sn−β, for positive constant β ≤ c22/(3c1). Recall that
P(Ec2) = P
( S⋃
i=1
{qˆi,1 < U(pi; c1, c1), eεqi ≥ pi}
)
.
If pi ≤ (c1eε lnn)/n, P({qˆi,1 < U(pi; c1, c2), eεpi ≥ qi}) = 0. If pi > (c1eε lnn)/n, it follows from
Lemma 2 that
P({qˆi,1 < U(pi; c1, c2), eεqi ≥ pi}) = P({Poi (nqi) < ne−εpi −
√
c2e−εpin lnn, qi ≥ e−εpi})
≤ P({Poi (ne−εpi) < ne−εpi −
√
c2e−εpin lnn, qi ≥ e−εpi})
≤ e− c2 lnn2 .
As c2/2 ≥ c22/(3c1), we have P(Ec2) ≤ Sn−β.
Finally, we show that P(Ec3) ≤ Sn−β for β ≤ min{(c1 − c2)2/(4c1), (
√
c1 −√c2)2/3}. Recall
P(Ec3) = P(
S⋃
i=1
{qˆi,1 ∈ U(pi; c1, c2), qi /∈ U(pi; c1, c1)}) .
If pi ≤ (c1eε lnn)/n,
P({qˆi,1 ∈ U(pi; c1, c2), qi /∈ U(pi; c1, c1)}) = P({Poi (nqi) ≤ (c1 + c2) lnn, nqi ≥ 2c1 lnn})
≤ P({Poi (2c1 lnn) ≤ (c1 + c2) lnn})
≤ e−
(c1−c2)2
4c1
lnn
.
If pi > (c1e
ε lnn)/n,
P({qˆi,1 ∈ U(pi; c1, c2), qi > U(pi; c1, c1)})
= P({Poi (nqi) ≤ ne−εpi +
√
c2e−εpin lnn, nqi > ne−εpi +
√
c1e−εpin lnn})
≤ P({Poi (ne−εpi +
√
c1e−εpin lnn) ≤ ne−εpi +
√
c2e−εpin lnn})
≤ e
−
(
(
√
c1−
√
c2)
√
e−εpin lnn
ne−εpi+
√
c1e
−εpin lnn
)2
1
2
(ne−εpi+
√
c1e−εpin lnn)
≤ e− (
√
c1−
√
c2)
2 lnn
4 ,
Similarly, we can show that P({qˆi,1 ∈ U(pi; c1, c2), qi < U(pi; c1, c1)}) ≤ e−(
√
c1−√c2)2 lnn/3.
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4.3.2 Proof of Lemma 15
Let ∆ = (c1 lnn)/n. We divide the analysis into two regimes.
Case 1: p ≤ eε∆ and q ∈ U(p, c1, c1) = [0, 2∆].
First we analyze the bias. As we apply the universally minimum variance unbiased estimator
(MVUE) to DK(q; p), the bias is entirely due to the functional approximation. Recall that we
consider the best polynomial approximation HK(y) of function g(y) = [p− eε2∆y]+ on [0, 1] with
order K, i.e. HK(y) = arg minP∈polyK maxy′∈[0,1]
∣∣ g(y′)−P (y′) ∣∣. Denote it as HK(y) = ∑Kj=0 ajyj .
Then DK(x; p) = HK(x/(2∆)). It follows from Lemma 9 that there exists a universal constant
M ≥ 0 such that for all K ≥ 1,
sup
x∈[0,2∆]
∣∣DK(x; p)− [p− eεx]+ ∣∣ = sup
y∈[0,1]
∣∣DK(2∆y; p)− [p− eε2∆y]+ ∣∣
= sup
y∈[0,1]
|HK(y)− g(y)|
≤ M
(
p ∧ 1
K
√
eεc1p lnn
n
)
. (75)
Next to analyze the variance, we upper bound the magnitude of the coefficients in D˜K using
Lemma 11, and upper bound the second moment of the unique MVUE using the tail bound of
Poisson distribution in Lemma 12. As the universal MVUE is of the form
∑K
j=0 aj(2∆)
−j∏j−1
k=0(pˆ−
k/n) as shown in Section 4.1.3, The variance is upper bounded by
Var( D˜K(qˆ; p) ) = Var
( K∑
j=0
aj(2∆)
−j
j−1∏
k=0
(qˆ − k
n
)
)
≤
( K∑
j=0
|aj |(2∆)−j
(
Var
( j−1∏
k=0
(qˆ − k
n
)
)) 12)2
≤ max
0≤j′≤K
|aj′ |2
( K∑
j=1
(2∆)−j
(
4∆q
) j
2
)2
(76)
= max
0≤j′≤K
|aj′ |2
( K∑
j=1
( q
∆
) j
2
)2
= max
0≤j′≤K
|aj′ |2 q
∆
(K−1∑
j=0
( q
∆
) j
2
)2
≤ max
0≤j′≤K
|aj′ |2 q
∆
(K−1∑
j=0
2
j
2
)2
. e2εBK∆2 q
∆
(77)
. BK e
εc1 lnn
n
(eεq) ,
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where B is some universal constant, we use q ≤ 2∆ and ∆ = (c1 lnn)/n in the last inequality, and
(76) follows from Lemma 12, (77) from Lemma 11. Concretely, it follows from Lemma 12 that for
M2 = max
{
2n∆,K
}
= 2n∆,
Var
( j−1∏
k=0
(qˆ − k
n
)
) ≤ E( j−1∏
k=0
(qˆ − k
n
)
)2 ≤ (2M2q
n
)j
=
(
4∆q
)j
.
To apply Lemma 11, we first transform the domain of the polynomial approximation to be
symmetric around the origin by change of variables. We consider HK(z
2) =
∑K
j=0 ajz
2j , which is
a polynomial with degree no more than 2K and satisfies
sup
z∈[−1,1]
|HK(z2)| ≤M1eε∆ .
This bound follows from a triangular inequality applied to maxy∈[0,1] |g(y)| . eε∆ and supy∈[0,1] |HK(y)−
g(y)| . eε∆. It follows that there exists a universal constant M1 > 0 such that supy∈[0,1] |HK(y)| ≤
M1e
ε∆. It follows from Lemma 11 that for all 0 ≤ j ≤ K,
|aj | ≤M1eε∆(
√
2 + 1)2K . (78)
Case 2: p > eε∆ and q ∈ [e−εp−
√
e−εp∆, e−εp+
√
e−εp∆].
First, we analyze the bias. In this regime, we claim that the best polynomial approximation
DK(x; p) of [p− eεx]+ is given by
DK(x; p) =
eε
2
K∑
j=0
rj
(√
e−εp∆
)−j+1
(x− e−εp)j + p− e
εx
2
, (79)
where rj ’s are defined from the best polynomial approximation RK(y) of g(y) = |y| on [−1, 1] with
order K: RK(y) =
∑K
j=0 rjy
j . And it is well known (e.g. [DL93, Chapter 9, Theorem 3.3]) that
there exists a universal constant M3 such that |RK(y) − |y|| ≤ M3/K, for all y ∈ [−1, 1]. As
[a]+ = (1/2)a+ (1/2)|a|, the optimality of DK(x; q) follows from
∣∣DK(x; p)− [p− eεx]+ ∣∣ = ∣∣eε∑Kj=0 rj(√e−εp∆)−j+1(x− e−εp)j − |p− eεx|
2
+
(p− eεx)− (p− eεx)
2
∣∣
=
eε
2
∣∣∣ K∑
j=0
rj
(√
e−εp∆
)−j+1
(x− e−εp)j − |e−εp− x|
∣∣∣
=
eε
√
e−εp∆
2
∣∣∣Rk(x− e−εp√
e−εp∆
)− |e
−εp− x√
e−εp∆
|
∣∣∣
=
√
eεp∆
2
∣∣∣Rk(y)− |y|∣∣∣ ,
29
where we let x = e−εp + y
√
e−εp∆, and we want small approximation error in y ∈ [−1, 1]. This
gives the desired bound on the bias:
|DK(x; p)− [p− eεx]+| =
√
eεp∆
2
∣∣∣Rk(y)− |y|∣∣∣ ≤ M3√eεp∆
K
. 1
K
√
eε p c1 lnn
n
Next, we analyze the variance. Recall from Lemma 12 that gj,c(qˆ) defined as
gj,c(qˆ) ,
j∑
k=0
(
j
k
)
(−c)j−k
k−1∏
h=0
(
qˆ − h
n
)
(80)
is the unique uniformly minimum variance unbiased estimator (MVUE) for (q − c)j , j ≥ 0, j ∈ N.
Hence,
D˜K(x; p) =
eε
2
( K∑
j=0
rj
(√
e−εp∆
)−j+1
gj,e−εp(qˆ) + g1,e−εp(qˆ)
)
(81)
Let aj = rj for j = 0, 2, 3, . . . ,K and a1 = r1 − 1 and we can write D˜K(x; p) as
D˜K(x; p) =
eε
2
K∑
j=0
aj
(√
e−εp∆
)−j+1
gj,e−εp(qˆ) .
It is shown in [CL+11, Lemma 2] that |rj | ≤ 23K , for 0 ≤ j ≤ K. So we can safely say
max0≤j≤K |aj |2 ≤ 4 · 26K . It follows from Lemma 12 that for M4 = max{n(q−e
−εp)2
q ,K},
Var(gj,e−εp(qˆ)) ≤ Eg2j,e−εp(qˆ) ≤ (
2M4q
n
)j .
Note that if q = 0, the variance is 0. We consider the case q 6= 0. The variance is
Var(D˜K(x; p)) =
e2ε
4
Var(
K∑
j=0
aj
(√
e−εp∆
)−j+1
gj,e−εp(qˆ))
≤ e
2ε
4
( K∑
j=0
|aj |
(√
e−εp∆
)−j+1
Var
1
2 (gj,e−εp(qˆ))
)2
≤ e2ε26Ke−εp∆
( K∑
j=0
(√
e−εp∆
)−j
(
2M4q
n
)
j
2
)2
= eε26Kp∆
( K∑
j=0
(
2M4q
ne−εp∆
)
j
2
)2
≤ eε26Kp∆
(cK+1 − 1
c− 1
)2
(82)
≤ c
2
(c− 1)2 (8c)
2Keεp∆
. BK c1 lnn
n
eεp ,
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where c = max{√2, 2√c3/c1}, and B > 0 is some universal constant as c3 < c1. The inequality in
(82) follows from
√
2M4q/(ne−εp∆) ≤ c, which follows from√
2Kq
ne−εp∆
≤
√
2K(e−εp+
√
e−εp∆)
ne−εp∆
≤
√
2K · 2e−εp
ne−εp∆
=
√
4c3
c1
, and√
2q
ne−εp∆
· n(q − e
−εp)2
q
=
√
2(q − e−εp)2
e−εp∆
≤
√
2e−εp∆
e−εp∆
=
√
2 .
4.4 Proof of Theorem 5
Note that dε(P‖Q) =
∑S
i=1[pi−eεqi]+ is well defined even if Q does not sum to exactly one. Define
a set of such approximate probability vectors as
MS(ζ) =
{
Q :
∣∣∣ S∑
i=1
qi − 1
∣∣∣ ≤ ζ} . (83)
Later in this section, we use the method of two fuzzy hypotheses from [Tsy08] to show that for
some χ &
∑S
j=1 pj ∧
√
eεpj/(n lnn) and χ ≤ eε, the estimation error exceeds χ/4 with a strictly
positive probability, under a minimax setting over the approximate probability class MS(ζ) with
ζ = χ/(10eε):
inf
d̂ε(P‖Qn)
sup
Q∈MS(χ/(10eε))
P
(∣∣d̂ε(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)∣∣ ≥ χ
4
)
≥ 1
3
, (84)
for a sufficiently large n, where we extend the definition of Qn to be Poisson sampling each alphabet
with the appropriate rate. This gives a lower bound on the minimax risk for ζ = χ/(10eε):
R(S, n, P, ζ) , inf
d̂ε(P‖Qn)
sup
Q∈MS(ζ)
EQ
[(
d̂ε(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)
)2]
(85)
≥ χ
2
16
{
inf
d̂ε(P‖Qn)
sup
Q∈MS(ζ)
Q
(∣∣d̂ε(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)∣∣ ≥ χ
4
)}
≥ χ
2
48
,
As our goal is to prove a lower bound on the minimax error, which is R(S, n, P, 0), we use the
following lemma. We provide a proof in Section 4.4.1.
Lemma 16. For any S, n ∈ N+, 0 < ζ < 1, any distribution P ∈ MS, and any ε > 0 that defines
the quantity dε(·‖·) used in the definition of R(·) in (85), we have
R(S, n(1− ζ)/4, P, 0) ≥ 1
4
R(S, n, P, ζ)− 1
2
e−n(1−ζ)/8 − 1
2
e2εζ2 . (86)
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This implies that for our choice of ζ = χ/(10eε),
R(S, n(1− ζ)/4, P, 0) ≥ 1
4
R(S, n, P, ζ)− 1
2
e−n(1−ζ)/8 − 1
2
e2εζ2
≥ χ
2
192
− 1
2
e−n(1−χ/(10e
ε))/8 − χ
2
200
& χ2
&
 S∑
j=1
pj ∧
√
eεpj
n lnn
2 ,
where ζ ≤ 1/10, which follows from χ ≤ eε, this proves the desired theorem.
Now, we are left to prove Eq. (84), by applying the following Lemma from [Tsy08]. The idea is
to construct two fuzzy hypotheses, such that they are sufficiently close to each other (as measured
by total variation) to be challenging, while sufficiently separated in dε. Translating the theorem
into our context, we get the following corollary.
Lemma 17 (Corollary of [Tsy08, Theorem 2.15]). For any s > 0, ζ > 0, 0 ≤ β0, β1 < 1, λ ∈ R, if
there exists two distributions σ0 and σ1 on Q = [q1, . . . , qS ] ∈MS(ζ) such that
σ0(Q : dε(P‖Q) ≤ λ− s) ≥ 1− β0 , (87)
σ1(Q : dε(P‖Q) ≥ λ+ s) ≥ 1− β1 , (88)
and DTV(F1, F0) ≤ η < 1, then
inf
d̂ε(P‖Qn)
sup
Q∈MS(ζ)
PQ
(
|d̂ε(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)| ≥ s
)
≥ 1− η − β0 − β1
2
, (89)
where Fi is the marginal distribution of Qn given the prior σi for i ∈ {0, 1}.
We construct two hypotheses, satisfying the assumptions with choices of s = χ/4 &
∑S
j=1 pj ∧√
eεpj/(n lnn) and η, β0, β1 = o(1) such that Eq. (84) follows. We will first introduce the con-
struction, check the separation conditions in Eqs. (87) and (88), and check the total variation
condition.
Constructing two prior distributions. Fix the distribution P ∈ MS , and assume pS =
min1≤i≤S pi. Let µ0, µ1 be two prior distributions on the parameter Q where Qn will be drawn
from, and set
µ0 = µ
(p1)
0 ⊗ µ(p2)0 ⊗ . . .⊗ µ(pS−1)0 ⊗ δ1−γ , (90)
µ1 = µ
(p1)
1 ⊗ µ(p2)1 ⊗ . . .⊗ µ(pS−1)1 ⊗ δ1−γ , (91)
where
γ =
∑
j:pj≤ ceε lnnn
pj
eεD
+
∑
j:pj>
ceε lnn
n
e−εpj , (92)
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and c ∈ (0, 1) is a constant, D is the universal constant in Lemma 21. Note that this does not
produce a valid probability distribution, as it will not sum to one almost surely. However, this is
sufficient as we can bound the difference in the minimax rate between exact and approximate prob-
ability distributions using Lemma 16. This choice of γ ensures that the sum
∑S
j=1 qj concentrates
around one. For a p ∈ (0, 1), we construct µ(p)i , i ∈ {0, 1} depending on p in two separate cases.
Our goal is to construct two prior distributions, which match in the first L degree moments (such
that the marginal total variation distance is sufficiently small), but at the same time sufficiently
different in estimation of dε, such that they differ approximately as much as the resolution of the
best polynomial function approximation.
Case 1: p > (ceε lnn)/n, for some constant c ∈ (0, 1). Define function g(x) = e−εp +
(
√
(ce−εp lnn)/n)x, where x ∈ [−1, 1]. Let νi, i = 0, 1 be two measures constructed in Lemma 18.
Lemma 18 ( [CL+11, Lemma 1]). For any positive integer L > 0, there exists two probability
measure ν0 and ν1 on [−1, 1] such that
1.
∫
tlν1(dt) =
∫
tlν0(dt), for all l = 0, 1, 2, . . . , L;
2.
∫
[−t]+ν1(dt)−
∫
[−t]+ν0(dt) = ∆L[[−t]+; [−1, 1]],
where ∆L[[−t]+; [−1, 1]] is the distance in the uniform norm on [−1, 1] from the function [−t]+ to
the space of polynomial functions of degree L: polyL.
We define two new measures µ
(p)
i , i = 0, 1 on [e
−εp−
√
ce−εp lnn
n , e
−εp+
√
ce−εp lnn
n ] by µ
(p)
i (A) =
νi(g
−1(A)). Note that we need the lower bound on p to ensure that this is non-negative. Let
L = d2 lnn, d2 > 1. It follows that
1. ∫
tµ
(p)
1 (dt) =
∫
tµ
(p)
0 (dt) = e
−εp ; (93)
2. ∫
tlµ
(p)
1 (dt) =
∫
tlµ
(p)
0 (dt), ∀l = 2 . . . , L+ 1; (94)
3. ∫
[p− eεt]+µ(p)1 (dt)−
∫
[p− eεt]+µ(p)0 (dt) =
√
ceεp lnn
n
∆L[[−t]+; [−1, 1]]
& p ∧
√
ceεp
d22n lnn
. (95)
The last inequality follows from the following lemma, with a choice of L = d2 lnn for some constant
d2.
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Lemma 19 ([Ber14] ). For L > 1,
∆L[[−t]+; [−1, 1]] = ∆L[|t|; [−1, 1]] = β∗L−1(1 + o(1))  1
L
, (96)
where β∗ ≈ 0.2802 is the Bernstein constant.
Case 2: 0 < p ≤ (ceε lnn)/n, for some constant c ∈ (0, 1). When p is too close to zero,
directly applying the above strategy only gives a lower bound on the difference in dε under the two
hypotheses that scales only as p/ lnn, and not as
√
p/(n lnn) as desired. Instead, we construct an
approximation of f(x; a) = ([a− eεx]+ − a)/(eεx).
Our strategy is to first construct two prior distributions ν˜η,ai ’s on {0}∪ [η, 1] which are difference
in estimating f(x; a) = ([a− eεx]+ − a)/(eεx) (instead of [a−eεx]+). The non-smoothness of f(x; a)
near zero allows one to control the hardness of this estimation by choosing η, while ensuring the
non-negativity of the resulting random variable p drawn from µi’s and also the expectation is
close to q. Concretely, we let µ
(p)
i to be a measure on {0} ∪ [p/(Deε),M ], where g(x) = Mx and
µ
(q)
i = ν˜
η,a
0 (g
−1(A)). We first construct two new probability measures ν˜η,ai , i = 0, 1 from the two
probability measures νη,ai , i = 0, 1 constructed in Lemma 20.
Lemma 20. Let f(x; a) , ([a− eεx]+ − a)/(eεx), a ∈ [0, 1]. For any 0 < η < 1 and positive
integer L > 0, there exists two probability measure νη,a0 and ν
η,a
1 on [η, 1] such that
1.
∫
tlνη,a1 (dt) =
∫
tlνη,a0 (dt), for all l = 0, 1, 2, . . . , L;
2.
∫
f(t; a)νη,a1 (dt)−
∫
f(t; a)νη,a0 (dt) = ∆L[f(x; a); [η, 1]],
where ∆L[f(x; a); [η, 1]] is the distance in the uniform norm on [η, 1] from the function f(x; a) to
the space of polynomial functions of degree L: polyL.
We construct ν˜η,ai by scaling down ν
η,a
i and putting the remaining probability mass on zero.
This ensures that the restriction on [η, 1] of ν˜η,ai is absolutely continuous with ν
η,a
i , and we construct
the Radon-Nikodym derivative to be
dν˜η,ai
dnuη,ai
=
η
t
≤ 1, t ∈ [η, 1] , (97)
and ν˜η,ai ({0}) = 1− ν˜η,ai ([η, 1]) ≥ 0. This choice of scaling ensures that
It follows that ν˜η,ai , i = 0, 1 are probability measures on [0, 1] that satisfy the following properties
1.
∫
tν˜η,a1 (dt) =
∫
tν˜η,a0 (dt) = η;
2.
∫
tlν˜η,a1 (dt) =
∫
tlν˜η,a0 (dt), for all l = 2, . . . , L+ 1;
3.
∫
[a− eεt]+ν˜η,a1 (dt)−
∫
[a− eεt]+ν˜η,a0 (dt) = ηeε∆L[f(x; a); [η, 1]].
Define
L = d2 lnn, η =
a
D
, a =
p
eεM
, M =
2c lnn
n
, (98)
where D is a universal constant in Lemma 21 and d2 > 1 is a constant.
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Lemma 21. Let f(x; a) := [a−e
εx]+−a
eεx , a ∈ (0, 12 ], x ∈ [0, 1], there exists universal constant D such
that
∆L
[
f(x; a); [
a
D
, 1]
]
&
(
1 ∧ 1
L
√
a
)
. (99)
Let g(x) = Mx and let µ
(p)
i be the measure on [0,M ] defined by µ
(p)
i = ν˜
η,a
0 (g
−1(A)). Then we
have µ
(p)
i (A) = Mν˜
η,a
0 (A). It then follows that
1. ∫
tµ
(p)
1 (dt) =
∫
tµ
(p)
0 (dt) =
p
eεD
; (100)
2. ∫
tlµ
(p)
1 (dt) =
∫
tlµ
(p)
0 (dt), ∀l = 2 . . . , L+ 1; (101)
3. ∫
[p− eεt]+µ(p)1 (dt)−
∫
[p− eεt]+µ(p)0 (dt) = η eεM ∆L[f(x; a); [
a
D
, 1]] (102)
& p ∧
√
ceεp
d22n lnn
. (103)
Separation conditions. In both cases, since we set qS = 1 − γ, which is defined in Eq. (92), it
follows from Eq. (100) and (93) that
Eµ0
 n∑
j=1
qj
 = Eµ1
 n∑
j=1
qj
 = 1 . (104)
Let
χ = Eµ1 [dε(P‖Q)]− Eµ0 [dε(P‖Q)] , (105)
ζ =
χ
10eε
. (106)
We know from Eq. (103) and (95) that, by construction, the estimates are separated in expec-
tation:
χ &
S−1∑
j=1
pj ∧
√
ceεpj
d22n lnn
≥ (1− 1
S
)
S∑
j=1
pj ∧
√
ceεpj
d22n lnn
&
S∑
j=1
pj ∧
√
ceεpj
d22n lnn
,
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where the second inequality follows from the assumption that pS = min1≤j≤S pj . To show concen-
tration of Eµi [dε(P‖Q)] around its mean, for i = 0, 1, we introduce the events
Ei = MS(ζ) ∩
{
Q :
∣∣∣dε(P‖Q)− Eµi[dε(P‖Q)]∣∣∣ ≤ χ4} . (107)
Introduce
F (P ) =
∑
j:pj≤ ceε lnnn
(
2c lnn
n
)2
+
∑
j:pj>
ceε lnn
n
(
4ce−εpj lnn
n
)
≤ 4c
2S ln2 n
n2
+
4ce−ε lnn
n
.
It follows from the union bound and Hoeffding bound that
µi(E
c
i ) ≤ µi
∣∣∣ S∑
j=1
qj − 1
∣∣∣ > ζ
+ µi (∣∣∣dε(P‖Q)− Eµi[dε(P‖Q)]∣∣∣ > χ4)
≤ 2 exp
(
− 2ζ
2
F (P )
)
+ 2 exp
(
− χ
2
8F (P )
)
.
Then we choose parameter c such that µi(E
c
i ) can be made arbitrarily small. Since we assumed
c ∈ (0, 1) and d2 > 1, and from the assumption that
∑S
j=1 pj ∧
√
eεpj
n lnn ≥ C ′
(√
eε lnn
n +
eε
√
S lnn
n
)
,
we have
ζ  χ
eε
& 1
eε
S∑
j=1
pj ∧
√
ceεpj
d22n lnn
≥
√
c
eεd2
S∑
j=1
pj ∧
√
eεpj
n lnn
≥
√
c
d2
C ′
(√
e−ε lnn
n
+
√
S lnn
n
)
& 1
d2
C ′
(√
ce−ε lnn
n
+
c
√
S lnn
n
)
& 1
d2
C ′
√
F (P ) .
Hence, it suffices to take C ′ large enough to ensure µi(Eci ), is as small as we desire for i = 0, 1.
So with this constant C ′, we have
µ0
(
dε(P‖Q) ≤ Eµ0
[
dε(P‖Q)
]
+
χ
4
)
≥ 1− β0 , (108)
µ1
(
dε(P‖Q) ≥ Eµ1
[
dε(P‖Q)
]− χ
4
)
≥ 1− β1 , (109)
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fo any constant β0 and β1, which satisfy the conditions of Lemma 17 and s = χ/4.
Total variation condition. Let Gi be marginal distribution of (X1, X2, . . . , XS) under priors µi
for i = 0, 1. Denote by pii the probability measures defined as
pii(A) =
µi (Ei ∩A)
µi (Ei)
, i = 0, 1 . (110)
Let Fi be marginal distribution of (X1, X2, . . . , XS) under priors pii for i = 0, 1.
Triangle inequality of total variation yields
TV(F0, F1) ≤ TV(F0, G0) + TV(G0, G1) + TV(G1, F1)
= sup
A
∣∣∣µ0(A)− µ0(A ∩ E0)
µ0(E0)
∣∣∣+ TV(G0, G1) + sup
A
∣∣∣µ1(A)− µ1(A ∩ E1)
µ1(E1)
∣∣∣
= TV(G0, G1) + µ0(E
c
0) + µ1(E
c
1) .
In view of fact that TV
(⊗Si=1Pi,⊗Si=1Qi) ≤∑Si=1 TV (Pi, Qi), we have
TV(G0, G1) ≤
S−1∑
i=1
TV(µ
(pi)
0 , µ
(pi)
1 )
≤
S−1∑
i=1
2
(
1
2
)d2 lnn
≤ 2S
nd2 ln 2
,
where in the second inequality we applied the following lemmas, assumming d2 to be large enough.
Lemma 22 ([WY16, Lemma 3] when qi ≤ ceε lnn/n). Suppose U0, U1 are two random variables
supported on [0,M ], where M ≥ 0 is constant. Suppose E[U j0 ] = E[U j1 ], 0 ≤ j ≤ L. Denote the
marginal distribution of X where X|λ ∼ Poi (λ), λ ∼ Ui as Fi for i = 0, 1. If L > 2eM , then
TV(F0, F1) ≤
(
2eM
L
)L
. (111)
Lemma 23 ([JHW18, Lemma 32] when qi > ce
ε lnn/n). Suppose U0, U1 are two random variables
supported on [a−M,a+M ], where a ≥M ≥ 0 are constants. Suppose E[U j0 ] = E[U j1 ], 0 ≤ j ≤ L.
Denote the marginal distribution of X where X|λ ∼ Poi (λ), λ ∼ Ui as Fi for i = 0, 1. If L + 1 ≥
(2eM)2/a, then
TV(F0, F1) ≤ 2
(
eM√
a(L+ 1)
)L+1
. (112)
Since there exists a constant C > 0 such that lnn ≥ C lnS, S ≥ 2, we can conclude that with
chosen parameters, T (F0, F1) = o(1).
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4.4.1 Proof of Lemma 16
We define minimax risk under the multinomial sampling model for a fixed P as
RB(S, n, P ) , inf
d̂ε(P‖Qn)
sup
Q∈MS
EQ
[(
d̂ε(P‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)
)2]
. (113)
Let Tˆ = Tˆ (X1, X2, . . . , XS) be a near-minimax estimator under multinomial model such that for
every sample size n,
sup
Q∈MS
EQ
[(
Tˆ − dε(P‖Q)
)2]
< RB(S, n, P ) + ξ , (114)
where ξ > 0.
For any Q ∈MS(ζ), let
∑S
i=1 qi = A, we have∣∣∣∣∣dε(P‖ Q∑S
i=1 qi
)− dε(P‖Q)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
S∑
i=1
∣∣[pi − eεqi/A]+ − [pi − eεqi]+∣∣
≤
S∑
i=1
eεqi|1/A− 1|
= eε|1−A|
≤ eεζ .
Now we consider risk of Tˆ for Q ∈ MS(ζ) under Poisson sampling model, where Xi are mu-
tually independent with marginal distributions Xi ∼ Poi (nqi). Let n′ =
∑S
i=1Xi, we know
n′ ∼ Poi (n∑Si=1 qi). In view of fact that conditioned on n′ = m, (X1, X2, . . . , XS) follows multi-
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nomial distribution parameterized by
(
m, Q∑S
i=1 qi
)
, we have
EQ
[(
Tˆ − dε(P‖Q)
)2]
(115)
= EQ
[(
Tˆ − dε
(
P‖ Q∑S
i=1 qi
)
+ dε
(
P‖ Q∑S
i=1 qi
)− dε(P‖Q))2] (116)
≤ 2EQ
[(
Tˆ − dε
(
P‖ Q∑S
i=1 qi
))2]
+ 2EQ
[(
dε
(
P‖ Q∑S
i=1 qi
)− dε(P‖Q))2] (117)
≤ 2EQ
[(
Tˆ − dε
(
P‖ Q∑S
i=1 qi
))2]
+ 2e2εζ2 (118)
= 2
∞∑
m=0
EQ
[(
Tˆ − dε
(
P‖ Q∑S
i=1 qi
))2|n′ = m]P(n′ = m) + 2e2εζ2 (119)
≤ 2
∞∑
m=0
RB(S,m,P )P(n′ = m) + 2(e2εζ2 + ξ) (120)
≤ 2 (1 · P(n′ ≤ n(1− ζ)/2)+RB(S, n(1− ζ)/2, P )P(n′ ≥ n(1− ζ)/2))
+2(e2εζ2 + ξ) (121)
≤ 2RB
(
S, n(1− ζ)/2, P )+ 2P(n′ ≤ n(1− ζ)/2)+ 2(e2εζ2 + ξ) (122)
≤ 2RB
(
S, n(1− ζ)/2, P )+ 2P(Poi (n(1− ζ)/2) ≤ n(1− ζ)/2)+ 2(e2εζ2 + ξ) (123)
≤ 2RB
(
S, n(1− ζ)/2, P )+ 2e−n(1−ζ)/8 + 2(e2εζ2 + ξ) , (124)
where (121) follows from RB(S,m,P ) ≤ 1, and the last inequality follows from Lemma 2. Taking
the supremum of EQ
[(
Tˆ − dε(P‖Q)
)2]
over MS(ζ) and using the arbitrariness of ζ, we have
R(S, n, P, ζ) ≤ 2RB
(
S, n(1− ζ)/2, P )+ 2e−n(1−ζ)/8 + 2e2εζ2 , (125)
which is equivalent to
RB
(
S, n(1− ζ)/2, P ) ≥ 1
2
R(S, n,Q, ζ)− e−n(1−ζ)/8 − e2εζ2 . (126)
It follows from [JVHW15, Lemma 16] that RB
(
S, n, P
) ≤ 2R(S, n/2, P, 0). Hence,
R(S, n(1− ζ)/4, P, 0) ≥ 1
2
RB(S, n(1− ζ)/2, Q) (127)
≥ 1
4
R(S, n, P, ζ)− 1
2
e−n(1−ζ)/8 − 1
2
e2εζ2 . (128)
4.4.2 Proof of Lemma 20
By [JHW18, Lemma 31], there are two probability measures νη,a1 and ν
η,a
0 on [η, 1] such that
1. ∫
tlνη,a1 (dt) =
∫
tlνη,a0 (dt), for all l = 0, 1, 2, . . . , L .
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2. ∫ |eεx− a| − a
eεx
νη,a1 (dt)−
∫ |eεx− a| − a
eεx
νη,a0 (dt) = 2∆L
[ |eεx− a| − a
eεx
; [η, 1]
]
,
which is equivalent to∫
2[a− eεx]+ − 2a
eεx
νη,a1 (dt)−
∫
2[a− eεx]+ − 2a
eεx
νη,a0 (dt) = 2∆L
[
[a− eεx]+ − a
eεx
; [η, 1]
]
.
The two desired measures are constructed.
4.4.3 Proof of Lemma 21
Let g(x; a) = [a−x]
+−a
x . We have
g(x; a) =
|x− a| − a
2x
− 1
2
. (129)
By the definition of best polynomial approximation error, for L > 1, we have
∆L
[
g(x; a); [
a
D
, 1]
]
= inf
h(x)∈PolyL
sup
x∈[ a
D
,1]
∣∣∣∣ |x− a| − a2x − 12 − h(x)
∣∣∣∣
= inf
h(x)∈PolyL
sup
x∈[ a
D
,1]
∣∣∣∣ |x− a| − ax − h(x)
∣∣∣∣
= ∆L
[ |x− a| − a
x
; [
a
D
, 1]
]
&
{
1
L
√
a
1
L2
≤ a ≤ 12
1 0 < a < 1
L2
,
where D is from [JHW18, Lemma 30].
Now we consider f(x; a) = [e
−εa−x]+−e−εa
x , where a ∈ (0, 1/2]. As e−εa ∈ (0, 12 ]. there exists
D > 0 such that
∆L
[
f(x; a); [
a
D
, 1]
]
≥ ∆L
[
f(x; a); [
e−εa
D
, 1]
]
&
(
1 ∧ 1
L
√
e−εa
)
≥
(
1 ∧ 1
L
√
a
)
. (130)
4.5 Proof of Theorem 7
Define good events, where our choice of regimes are correct as
E1 =
{{
i : pˆi,1 − eεqˆi,1 >
√
(c1 + c2) lnn
n
(
√
pˆi,1 +
√
eεqˆi,1)
}
⊆
{
i : eεqi ≤ pi
}}
, (131)
E2 =
{{
i : pˆi,1 − eεqˆi,1 < −
√
(c1 + c2) lnn
n
(
√
pˆi,1 +
√
eεqˆi,1)
}
⊆
{
i : eεqi ≥ pi
}}
, (132)
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E3 =
{{
i : eεqˆi,1 + pˆi,1 <
c1 lnn
n
}
⊆
{
i :
(
pi, e
εqi
) ∈ [0, 2c1 lnn
n
]2
}}
, (133)
and
E4 =
{{
i : (pˆi,1, e
εqˆi,1) ∈ U(c1, c1), pˆi,1 + eεqˆi,1 ≥ c1 lnn
n
}
⊆
{
i : (pi, e
εqi) ∈ U(c1, c1), pi + eεqi ≥ c1 lnn
2n
, pˆi,1 + e
εqˆi,1 ≥ pi + e
εqi
2
}}
. (134)
Denote the overall good event as
E = E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 ∩ E4 . (135)
Decompose the error under good events as
E1 ,
∑
i∈I1
{
pˆi,2 − eεqˆi,2 − [pi − eεqi]+
}
, (136)
E2 ,
∑
i∈I2
{
D˜
(1)
K (pˆi,2, qˆi,2)− [pi − eεqi]+
}
, (137)
E3 ,
∑
i∈I3
{
D˜
(2)
K (pˆi,2, qˆi,2; pˆi,1, qˆi,1)− [pi − eεqi]+
}
, (138)
where the indices of those regimes under the good events are
I1 ,
{
i : pˆi,1 − eεqˆi,1 >
√
(c1 + c2) lnn
n
(
√
pˆi,1 +
√
eεqˆi,1), e
εqi ≤ pi
}
, (139)
I2 ,
{
i : pˆi,1 + e
εqˆi,1 ≤ c1e
ε lnn
n
, (pi, e
εqi) ∈
[
0,
2c1 lnn
n
]2}
, (140)
I3 ,
{
i : pˆi,1 + e
εqˆi,1 ≥ c1 lnn
n
, (pˆi,1, e
εqˆi,1) ∈ U(c1, c2),
(pi, e
εqi) ∈ U(c1, c1), pi + eεqi ≥ c1 lnn
2n
, pˆi,1 + e
εqˆi,1 ≥ pi + e
εqi
2
}
. (141)
We can bound the squared error as
E
[ (
d̂ε,K,c1,c2(Pn‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)
)2 ] ≤ E[ (d̂ε,K,c1,c2(Pn‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q))2 I(E) ] + P(Ec)
≤ E[(E1 + E2 + E3)2] + P(Ec)
≤ 3E[E21 ] + 3E[E22 ] + 3E[E23 ] + P(Ec) . (142)
The last term on the bad event is bounded by 15S/nβ as shown in following lemma, with a
proof in 4.5.1.
Lemma 24. Assuming c2c1 <
8
(
√
2+1)2
−1 ≈ 0.373, and let β = min
{
c1
6 ,
(c1−c2)2
96c1
, 13
(√
2c1 −
√
2+1
2
√
c1 + c2
)2}
,
we have
P(Ec) ≤ 15S
nβ
, (143)
where good event E is defined in Eq. (135).
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For the first term in Eq. (142), we have
E[E21 ] = E[Var(E1|I1) + (E[E1|I1])2] = E[Var(E1|I1)] ≤
∑
i∈{i:eεqi≤pi}
pi + e
2εqi
n
. e
ε
n
(144)
where we use the fact that E[E1|I1] = 0 with probability one and the fact that pˆi,2 and qˆi,2 are
independent for indices in I1.
The second term in Eq. (142) is bounded by following lemma, with a proof in Section 4.5.3.
Lemma 25. Suppose (p, eεq) ∈
[
0, 2c1 lnnn
]2
, (npˆ, nqˆ) ∼ Poi (np)× Poi (nq). Then,
∣∣∣ED˜(1)K (pˆ, qˆ)− [p− eεq]+∣∣∣ . 1K
√
c1 lnn
n
(
√
p+
√
eεq) +
1
K2
c1 lnn
n
, (145)
and
Var
(
D˜
(1)
K (pˆ, qˆ)
)
. B
Kc1c
4
3 ln
5 n
n
(p+ eεq) , (146)
for some constant B > 0. The estimator D˜
(1)
K is introduced in Eq. (18) and K = c3 lnn, c3e
ε < c1.
We have
E[E23 ] (147)
.
S∑
i=1
BKc1c
4
3 ln
5 n
n
(pi + e
εqi) +
(
S∑
i=1
1
K
√
c1 lnn
n
(
√
pi +
√
eεqi) +
1
K2
c1 lnn
n
)2
(148)
. c1c
4
3 ln
5 n
n1−c3 lnB
(eε + 1) +
c1(e
ε + 1)S
c23n lnn
∨
(
c1S
c23n lnn
)2
. (149)
The third term in Eq. (142) is bounded by following lemma, with a proof in Section 4.5.4.
Lemma 26. Suppose (p, eεq) ∈ U(c1, c1), p + eεq ≥ c1 lnn2n , x + eεy ≥ p+e
εq
2 , x ∈ [0, 1], y ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose (npˆ, nqˆ) ∼ Poi (np)× Poi (nq). Then,∣∣∣ED˜(2)K (pˆ, qˆ;x, y)− [p− eεq]+∣∣∣ . 1K
√
c1 lnn
n
(
√
x+
√
eεy) , (150)
and
Var
(
D˜
(2)
K (pˆ, qˆ;x, y)
)
. B
Kc1 lnn
n
(x+ eεy) , (151)
for some constant B > 0, and K = c3 lnn, c3e
ε < c1.
We have
E
[E24 |pˆi,1, qˆi,1 : 1 ≤ i ≤ S] (152)
.
S∑
i=1
BKc1 lnn
n
(pˆi,1 + e
εqˆi,1) +
(
S∑
i=1
1
K
√
c1 lnn
n
(
√
pˆi,1 +
√
eεqˆi,1)
)2
, (153)
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where B is the larger constant defined in both Lemma 25 and Lemma 26.
Taking expectation with respect to {pˆi,1, qˆi,1 : 1 ≤ i ≤ S}, we have
E
[E24 ] (154)
.
S∑
i=1
c1 lnn
n1−c3 lnB
E (pˆi,1 + eεqˆi,1) + E
(
S∑
i=1
√
c1 (pˆi,1 + eεqˆi,1)√
c23n lnn
)2
(155)
. c1 lnn
n1−c3 lnB
(eε + 1) +
S∑
i=1
E
c1 (pˆi,1 + e
εqˆi,1)
c23n lnn
+ (156)
∑
1≤i,j≤S,i6=j
√
E [c1 (pˆi,1 + eεqˆi,1)]
c23n lnn
√
E [c1 (pˆj,1 + eεqˆj,1)]
c23n lnn
(157)
. c1 lnn
n1−c3 lnB
(eε + 1) +
c1
c23n lnn
(eε + 1) +
∑
1≤i,j≤S
c1 (pi + e
εqi + pj + e
εqj)
c23n lnn
(158)
. c1 lnn
n1−c3 lnB
(eε + 1) +
c1
c23n lnn
(eε + 1) . (159)
Combing everything together, we have
E
[ (
d̂ε,K,c1,c2(Pn‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)
)2 ]
(160)
. e
ε
n
+
(c1c
4
3 + c1) ln
5 n
n1−c3 lnB
(eε + 1) +
c1(e
ε + 1)S
c23n lnn
∨
(
c1S
c23n lnn
)2
+
S
nβ
. (161)
If lnn . lnS, as we assume c2c1 < 0.373, we can take c2 small enough and c1, c3 large enough to
guarantee that S
nβ
. Sn lnn ,
ln5 n
n1−c3 lnB .
S
n lnn . We have,
E
[ (
d̂ε,K,c1,c2(Pn‖Qn)− dε(P‖Q)
)2 ] . eεS
n lnn
. (162)
4.5.1 Proof of Lemma 24
The following lemma shows that non-smooth region U(c1, c2) contains the region U(p; c1, c2) defined
previously, which will be later used to bound the probability of bad events.
Lemma 27. The two-dimensional set U(c1, c1) defined in Eq. (7) satisfies
∪x=eεy,x,y∈[0,1]U(eεx; c1, c1)× U(e2εy; c1, c1) ⊂ U(c1, c1) . (163)
1) Analysis of P(Ec1):
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It follows from Lemma 27 that
P(Ec1) = P
(
S⋃
i=1
{
eεqi < pi, e
εqˆi,1 − pˆi,1 >
√
(c1 + c2) lnn
n
(
√
eεqˆi,1 +
√
pˆi,1)
})
≤ Smax
i∈[S]
P
(
eεqi < pi, e
εqˆi,1 − pˆi,1 >
√
(c1 + c2) lnn
n
(
√
eεqˆi,1 +
√
pˆi,1)
)
≤ Smax
i∈[S]
P
(
eεqi = pi, e
εqˆi,1 − pˆi,1 >
√
(c1 + c2) lnn
n
(
√
eεqˆi,1 +
√
pˆi,1)
)
≤ Smax
i∈[S]
P
(
eεqi = pi, (pˆi,1, e
εqˆi,1) /∈ U(c1, c2)
)
≤ Smax
i∈[S]
P
(
eεqi = pi, (pˆi,1, e
εqˆi,1) /∈ U(eεpi; c1 + c2
2
,
c1 + c2
2
)×
U(e2εqi;
c1 + c2
2
,
c1 + c2
2
)
)
≤ Smax
i∈[S]
(
1− P(pˆi,1 ∈ U(eεpi; c1 + c2
2
,
c1 + c2
2
)
)×
P
(
eεqi = pi, e
εqˆi,1 ∈ U(e2εqi; c1 + c2
2
,
c1 + c2
2
)
))
≤ S
(
1−
(
1− 2
n
c1+c2
6
)2)
≤ 4S
n
c1+c2
6
,
where we have applied Lemma 7 in the last inequality.
2) Analysis of P(Ec2): Similarly, we have
P(Ec2) ≤
4S
n
c1+c2
6
. (164)
3) Analysis of P(Ec3):
P(Ec3) = P
(
S⋃
i=1
{
(pi, e
εqi) /∈
[
0,
2c1 lnn
n
]2
, pˆi,1 + e
εqˆi,1 <
c1 lnn
n
})
≤ P
(
S⋃
i=1
{
pi + e
εqi >
2c1 lnn
n
, pˆi,1 + e
εqˆi,1 <
c1 lnn
n
})
≤ Smax
i∈[S]
P
(
pi + e
εqi >
2c1 lnn
n
, pˆi,1 + e
εqˆi,1 <
c1 lnn
n
)
≤ S
nc1/4
,
where we have applied Lemma 3 in the last inequality.
4) Analysis of P(Ec4):
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P(Ec4) ≤ Smax
i∈[S]
P ((pi, eεqi) /∈ U(c1, c1), (pˆi,1, eεqˆi,1) ∈ U(c1, c2)) +
Smax
i∈[S]
P
(
pˆi,1 + e
εqˆi,1 >
c1 lnn
n
, pi + e
εqi <
c1 lnn
2n
)
+
Smax
i∈[S]
P
(
pˆi,1 + e
εqˆi,1 ≥ c1 lnn
n
, pi + e
εqi ≥ 2(pˆi,1 + eεqˆi,1)
)
.
Using Lemma 3 again, we have
Smax
i∈[S]
P
(
pˆi,1 + e
εqˆi,1 >
c1 lnn
n
, pi + e
εqi <
c1 lnn
2n
)
≤ S
nc1/6
,
and
Smax
i∈[S]
P
(
pˆi,1 + e
εqˆi,1 ≥ c1 lnn
n
, pi + e
εqi ≥ 2(pˆi,1 + eεqˆi,1)
)
≤ Smax
i∈[S]
P
(
pi + e
εqi ≥ 2c1 lnn
n
, pi + e
εqi ≥ 2(pˆi,1 + eεqˆi,1)
)
≤ S
nc1/4
.
It suffices to show that for p, q ∈ [0, 1], there exists some constant c > 0 such that ⋃
(p,eεq)/∈U(c1,c1)
U(eεp; c, c)× U(e2εq; c, c)
⋂U(c1, c2) = ∅. (165)
Indeed, we have
Smax
i∈[S]
P ((pi, eεqi) /∈ U(c1, c1), (pˆi,1, eεqˆi,1) ∈ U(c1, c2))
≤ Smax
i∈[S]
P
(
(pˆi,1, e
εqˆi,1) /∈ U(eεpi; c, c)× U(e2εqi; c, c)
)
≤ Smax
i∈[S]
(
1− P(pˆi,1 ∈ U(eεpi; c, c))P(eεqˆi,1 ∈ U(e2εqi; c, c)))
≤ S
(
1−
(
1− 2
n
c
3
)2)
≤ 4S
nc/3
,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 7.
Now we work out a c that satisfies (165). We prove the case when
√
p−√eεq ≥
√
2c1 lnn
n . The
other case can be proved in a similar way. Assume c < c1. In this case p ≥ 2c1 lnnn . We will show
that for any point (x, eεy) ∈ U(eεp; c, c)× U(e2εq; c, c), we have √x−√eεy ≥
√
(c1+c2) lnn
n .
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If q ≤ ce−ε lnnn , for any (x, eεy) ∈ U(eεp; c, c)× U(e2εq; c, c), we have
√
x−√eεy ≥
√
p−
√
cp lnn
n
−
√
2c lnn
n
≥
√
2c1 lnn
n
−√2cc1 lnn
n
−
√
2c lnn
n
=
√
lnn
n
(√
2c1 −
√
2cc1 −
√
2c
)
,
where in the second step, we use the fact that x−√ax, a > 0 is a monotonically increasing function
when x ≥ a/4 and the fact that p ≥ 2c1 lnnn . Let c = (c1−c2)
2
32c1
, we can verify that
√
x−√eεy ≥
√
lnn
n
(√
2c1 −
√
2cc1 −
√
2c
)
≥
√
lnn
n
√
c1 + c2 . (166)
If q > ce
−ε lnn
n , for any (x, e
εy) ∈ U(eεp; c, c)× U(e2εq; c, c), we have
√
x−√eεy ≥
√
p−
√
cp lnn
n
−
√
eεq +
√
ceεq lnn
n
=
p−
√
cp lnn
n − eεq −
√
ceεq lnn
n√
p−
√
cp lnn
n +
√
eεq +
√
ceεq lnn
n
=
(
√
p−√eεq)(√p+√eεq)−
√
c lnn
n (
√
eεq +
√
p)√
p−
√
cp lnn
n +
√
eεq +
√
ceεq lnn
n
≥ (√2c1 −
√
c)
√
lnn
n
√
p+
√
eεq√
p−
√
cp lnn
n +
√
eεq +
√
ceεq lnn
n
.
Further, since eεq > c lnnn ,
√
p+
√
eεq√
p−
√
cp lnn
n +
√
eεq +
√
ceεq lnn
n
≥
√
p+
√
eεq√
p+
√
2eεq
≥
√
eεq +
√
2c1 lnn
n +
√
eεq
√
2eεq +
√
eεq +
√
2c1 lnn
n
≥ 2√
2 + 1
,
where in the second inequality, we used the fact that x+
√
eεq
x+
√
2eεq
is a monotonically increasing function
of x when x ≥ 0, and in the third inequality, we used the fact that 2x+a
(
√
2+1)x+a
is a monotonically
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decreasing function of x when a > 0, x > 0. To guarantee that
√
x−√eεy ≥
√
(c1+c2) lnn
n , we need
2√
2 + 1
(√
2c1 −
√
c
) ≥ √c1 + c2 , (167)
which is equivalent to
c ≤
(
√
2c1 −
√
2 + 1
2
√
c1 + c2
)2
, (168)
with the constraint that c2c1 <
8
(
√
2+1)2
− 1 ≈ 0.373.
4.5.2 Proof of Lemma 27
If x ≤ c1eε lnnn and thus y ≤ c1 lnnn , it suffices to show [0, 2c1 lnnn ]2 ⊂ U(c1, c1). For (u, eεv) ∈
[0, 2c1 lnnn ]
2, we have
|√u−√eεv| ≤
√
2c1 lnn
n
. (169)
For x > c1e
ε lnn
n and thus y >
c1 lnn
n , it suffices to show
[
x−
√
c1x lnn
n , x+
√
c1x lnn
n
]2
⊂
U(c1, c1). It is shown in [JHW18, Lemma 3] that for any (u, e
εv) ∈
[
y −
√
c1y lnn
n , y +
√
c1y lnn
n
]2
,
we have
|√u−√eεv| ≤
√
2c1 lnn
n
. (170)
4.5.3 Proof of Lemma 25
We first analyze the bias. Let ∆ = c1 lnnn . As we have applied unbiased estimator D˜
(1)
K (x, y) of
D
(1)
K (x, y), the bias is entirely due to the functional approximation. We show that for (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2,
|uK(x, y)vK(x, y)− [x− y]+| .
(√
x+
√
y
K +
1
K2
)
. Indeed, we have∣∣uK(x, y)vK(x, y)− [x− y]+∣∣
=
∣∣uK(x, y)vK(x, y)− uK(x, y)[√x−√y]+ + uK(x, y)[√x−√y]+ − [x− y]+∣∣
≤ |uK(x, y)||vK(x, y)− [
√
x−√y]+|+ [√x−√y]+|uK(x, y)−
√
x−√y|
≤ |uK(x, y)−
√
x−√y||vK(x, y)− [
√
x−√y]+|+
|√x+√y||vK(x, y)− [
√
x−√y]+|+ [√x−√y]+|uK(x, y)−
√
x−√y| .
It follows from Lemma 8 and Lemma 10 that
∆K
[√
x; [0, 1]
]
. 1
K
, (171)
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which implies
|uK(x, y)−
√
x−√y| . 1
K
. (172)
It follows from Lemma 8, Lemma 10 and the fact that [
√
b−√a]+ ≤ [√b−√c]+ + [√c−√a]+, we
have
|vK(x, y)− [
√
x−√y]+| . 1
K
. (173)
Together with Eq. (172), we have
∣∣uK(x, y)vK(x, y)− [x− y]+∣∣ . 1
K2
+
√
x+
√
y + [
√
x−√y]+
K
(174)
. 1
K2
+
√
x+
√
y
K
, (175)
which implies there exists a constant M > 0 such that
∣∣uK(x, y)vK(x, y)− uK(0, 0)vK(0, 0)− [x− y]+∣∣ ≤ M ( 1
K2
+
√
x+
√
y
K
)
. (176)
Let x = p/(2∆) and y = eεq/(2∆). We have
sup
(p,eεq)∈[0,2∆]2
∣∣∣ED˜(1)K (pˆ, qˆ)− [p− eεq]+∣∣∣
= sup
(p,eεq)∈[0,2∆]2
∣∣∣D(1)K (p, q)− [p− eεq]+∣∣∣
= sup
(p,eεq)∈[0,2∆]2
2∆
∣∣∣∣h2K( p2∆ , eεq2∆)− [ p2∆ − eεq2∆]+
∣∣∣∣
= sup
(x,y)∈[0,1]2
2∆
∣∣h2K(x, y)− [x− y]+∣∣
= sup
(x,y)∈[0,1]2
2∆
∣∣uK(x, y)vK(x, y)− uK(0, 0)vK(0, 0)− [x− y]+∣∣
≤ 2∆M
(
1
K2
+
√
x+
√
y
K
)
. 1
K
√
c1 lnn
n
(
√
p+
√
eεq) +
1
K2
c1 lnn
n
.
We now analyze the variance. Express the polynomial h2K(x, y) explicitly as
h2K(x, y) =
∑
0≤i≤2K,0≤j≤2K,i+j≥1
hijx
iyj (177)
=
∑
0≤i≤2K
 ∑
0≤j≤2K,i+j≥1
hijy
j
xi . (178)
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For any fixed value of y, h2K(x
2, y2) is a polynomial of x with degree no more than 4K that is
uniformly bounded by a universal constant on [0, 1]. It follows from Lemma 11 that for any fixed
y ∈ [−1, 1], ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
0≤j≤2K
hijy
2j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ M(√2 + 1)4K , (179)
which together with Lemma 11, implies that
|hij | ≤ M(
√
2 + 1)8K . (180)
Since D˜
(1)
K is the unbiased estimator of 2∆h2K(
p
2∆ ,
eεq
2∆ ), we know
D˜
(1)
K (pˆ, qˆ) =
∑
0≤i,j≤2K,i+j≥1
hij(2∆)
1−i−jejεgi,0(pˆ)gj,0(qˆ) , (181)
where gi,0(pˆ) =
∏i−1
k=0(pˆ− km) introduced by Lemma 12.
Denote ‖X‖2 =
√
E(X − EX)2 for random variable X, and M1 = 2K ∨ 2n∆, M2 = 2K ∨
2ne−ε∆. Using triangle inequality of the norm ‖ · ‖2 and Lemma 12, we know
‖D˜(1)K (pˆ, qˆ)‖2 ≤
∑
0≤i,j≤2K,i+j≥1
|hij | (2∆)1−i−jejε ‖gi,0(pˆ)‖2 ‖gj,0(qˆ)‖2
≤
∑
0≤i,j≤2K,i+j≥1
M(
√
2 + 1)8K(2∆)
(
1
2∆
√
2M1p
n
)i(
eε
2∆
√
2M2q
n
)j
≤ (
√
2 + 1)8K
c1 lnn
n
∑
0≤i,j≤2K,i+j≥1
(√
p
2∆
)i(√
eεq
2∆
)j
.
Since for any x ∈ [0, 1]. y ∈ [0, 1],∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
0≤i,j≤2K,i+j≥1
xiyj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2K∑
j=1
yj
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
2K∑
i=1
xi
∣∣∣∣∣+ xy
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
0≤i,j≤2K−1
xiyj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ y(2K) + x(2K) + xy(2K)2
≤ 2(2K)2(x+ y) ,
we know
‖D˜(1)K (pˆ, qˆ)‖2 . (
√
2 + 1)8K
c1K
2 lnn
n
(√
p
2∆
+
√
eεq
2∆
)
(182)
.
√
BK
c1c53 ln
5 n
n
(p+ eεq) , (183)
for some constant B > 0.
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4.5.4 Proof of Lemma 26
We first analyze the bias. As we apply the unbiased estimator D˜
(2)
K (pˆ, qˆ;x, y) of D
(2)
K (p, q;x, y). The
bias is entirely due to the functional approximation error. Namely,
E
[
D˜
(2)
K (pˆ, qˆ;x, y)|x, y
]
= D
(2)
K (p, q;x, y) (184)
=
1
2
K∑
j=0
rjW
−j+1(eεq − p)j + p− e
εq
2
, (185)
where W =
√
8c1 lnn
n (
√
eεx+ y), and rj is defined as the coefficient of best polynomial approxima-
tion RK(t) of |t| over [−1, 1] with order K: RK(t) =
∑K
j=0 rjt
j .
Since (p, eεq) ∈ U(c1, c1), we know
|p− eεq| ≤
√
2c1 lnn
n
(√
p+
√
eεq
)
≤
√
2c1 lnn
n
√
2
(√
p+ eεq
)
≤
√
2c1 lnn
n
√
2
(√
2(x+ eεy)
)
≤ W
where we have used the fact that
√
p +
√
eεq ≤ √2(p+ eεq) and the assumption that p + eεq ≤
2(x+ eεy).
It is known in [DL93, Chapter 9, Theorem 3.3] that
|Rk(t)− |t|| . 1
K
, (186)
for all t ∈ [−1, 1].
We show D
(2)
K (p, q;x, y) is best polynomial approximation of [p− eεq]+. We have∣∣∣D(2)K (p, q;x, y)− [p− eεq]+∣∣∣ = 12
∣∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
j=0
rjW
−j+1(eεq − p)j − |p− eεq|
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
W
2
∣∣∣∣RK(eεq − pW )− ∣∣∣eεq − pW ∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
. W
K
. 1
K
√
c1 lnn
n
(
√
x+
√
eεy) .
Now we analyze the variance.
Let aj = rj for j = 0, 2, 3, . . . ,K and a1 = r1 − 1 we can write D(2)K (p, q;x, y) as
D
(2)
K (p, q;x, y) =
1
2
K∑
j=0
ajW
−j+1(eεq − p)j . (187)
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It was shown in [CL+11, Lemma 2] that rj ≤ 23K , 0 ≤ j ≤ K. So we have |aj | ≤ 2 · 23K . Denote
the unique uniformly minimum unbiased estimator (MVUE) of (eεq − p)j by Aˆj(pˆ, qˆ). Then the
unbiased estimator D˜
(2)
K of polynomial function D
(2)
K is
D˜
(2)
K (pˆ, qˆ;x, y) =
1
2
K∑
j=0
ajW
−j+1Aˆj(pˆ, qˆ) . (188)
Denote ‖X‖2 =
√
E(X − EX)2 for random variable X. It follows from triangle inequality of
‖ · ‖2 and Lemma 13 that
‖D˜(2)K (pˆ, qˆ;x, y)‖2 ≤
1
2
K∑
j=1
|aj |W−j+1‖Aˆj‖2 (189)
≤ 23KW
K∑
j=1
(√
2|eεq − p|
W
∨
√
8j(e2εq ∨ p)√
nW
)j
, (190)
where
√
2|eεq − p|
W
∨
√
8j(e2εq ∨ p)√
nW
≤
√
2
√
2c1 lnn
n (
√
eεq +
√
p)√
8c1 lnn
n
√
eεy + x
∨
√
8K(e2εq + p)
√
n
√
8c1 lnn
n
√
eεy + x
≤
√
eεq +
√
p√
2
√
eεy + x
∨
√
c3
c1
√
e2εq + p√
eεy + x
≤
√
2 ∨
√
2c3eε
c1
≤
√
2 .
Consequently,
‖D˜(2)K (pˆ, qˆ;x, y)‖2 ≤ 23KWK(
√
2)K
≤ 23K
√
8c1 lnn
n
√
x+ eεyK(
√
2)K
≤
√
BK
(x+ eεy)c1 lnn
n
,
where B > 0 is some constant.
5 Conclusion
We investigate the fundamental trade-off between accuracy and sample size in estimating differential
privacy guarantees from a black-box access to a purportedly private mechanism. Such a data-driven
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approach to verifying privacy guarantees will allow us to hold accountable the mechanisms in the
wild that are not faithful to the claimed privacy guarantees, and help find and fix bugs in either the
design or the implementation. To this end, we propose a polynomial approximation based approach
to estimate the differential privacy guarantees. We show that in the high-dimensional regime, the
proposed estimator achieves sample size amplification effect. Compared to the parametric rate
achieved by the plug-in estimator, we achieve a factor of lnn gain in the sample size. A matching
lower bound proves the minimax optimality of our approach. Here, we list important remaining
challenges that are outside the scope of this paper.
Since the introduction of differential privacy, there have been several innovative notions of
privacy, such as pufferfish, concentrated DP, zCDP, and Renyi DP, proposed in [KM14, DR16,
SWC17, KOV17]. Our estimator builds upon the fact that differential privacy guarantee is a
divergence between two random outputs. This is no longer true for the other notions of privacy,
which makes it more challenging.
Characterizing the fundamental tradeoff for continuous mechanisms is an important problem, as
several popular mechanisms output continuous random variables, such as Laplacian and Gaussian
mechanisms. One could use non-parametric estimators such as k-nearest neighbor methods and
kernel methods, popular for estimating information theoretic quantities and divergences [BSY19,
GOV18, GOV16, JGH18]. Further, when the output is a mixture of discrete and continuous
variables, recent advances in estimating mutual information for mixed variables provide a guideline
for such complex estimation process [GKOV17].
There is a fundamental connection between differential privacy and ROC curves, as investigated
in [KOV17, KOV14, KOV15]. Binary hypothesis testing and ROC curves provide an important
measure of performance in generative adversarial networks (GAN) [SBL+18]. This fundamental
connection between differential privacy and GAN was first investigated in [LKFO18], where it was
used to provide an implicit bias for mitigating mode collapse, a fundamental challenge in training
GANs. A DP estimator, like the one we proposed, provides valuable tools to measure performance
of GANs. The main challenge is that GAN outputs are extremely high-dimensional (popular
examples being 1, 024× 1, 024,×3 dimensional images). Non-parametric methods have exponential
dependence in the dimension, rendering them useless. Even some recent DP approaches have output
dimensions that are equally large [HKC+18]. We need fundamentally different approach to deal
with such high dimensional continuous mechanisms.
We considered a setting where we create synthetic databases D and D′ and test the guarantees
of a mechanism of interest. Instead, [GM18] assumes we do not have such a control, and the privacy
of the real databases used in the testing needs to also be preserved. It is proven that one cannot
test the privacy guarantee of a mechanism without revealing the contents of the test databases.
Such fundamental limits suggest that the samples used in estimating DP needs to be destroyed
after the estimation. However, the estimated dε(PQ,D‖PQ,D′) still leaks some information about
the databases used, although limited. This is related to a challenging task of designing mechanisms
with (ε, δ)-DP guarantees when (ε, δ) also depends on the databases. Without answering any
queries, just publishing the guarantee of the mechanism on a set of databases reveal something
about the database. Detection and estimation under such complicated constraints is a challenging
open question.
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